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FEDERAL CONSISTENCY AND OUTER CONTINENTAL 
SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASING: THE APPLICATION 
OF THE "DIRECTLY AFFECTING" TEST TO 
PRE-LEASE SALE ACTIVITIES 
Karen L. Linsley-
1. INTRODUCTION 
The 1973 Arab oil embargo focused national attention on this coun-
try's growing dependence on the energy sources of the unstable and 
volatile Middle East. l In the following year, President Nixon 
launched Project Independence, a national program aimed at in-
creasing energy self-sufficiency. 2 Yet in spite of growing recognition 
of its adverse economic, military, and diplomatic implications, the 
amount of oil imported into the United States has risen dramatically 
in the past decade. Our dependence on foreign oil has in fact in-
creased from 3.4 million barrels a day in 1970 to 8.2 million barrels a 
day in 1979, while our foreign import bill has risen from $3 billion to 
$60 billion during the same period.3 
The Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) has long been recognized as the 
domestic energy source with the most potential for reducing the na-
• Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1. SENATE COMMITl'EE ON COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
COASTAL ZoNE MANAGEMENT ACT 577 (1976) [hereinafter cited as CZMA LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY]. This volume contains a complete legislative history of the Coastal Zone Management 
Act. 
2. See FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION, PROJECT INDEPENDENCE REPORT (1974); COMPo 
TROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS. OUTLOOK FOR FEDERAL 
GoALS TO ACCELERATE LEASING OF OIL AND GAS RESOURCES ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 
11-16 (1975), reprinted in Joint Hearings Before the Senate Committees on InterioT and In-
sular Affairs and Commerce on Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments and Coastal 
Zone Management Act Amendments, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1293-98 (1975). 
3. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE, Two ENERGY FUTURES: A NATIONAL CHOICE FOR THE 
80's 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as API Report]. 
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tion's dependence on foreign oil.4 Recent United States Geological 
Surveys estimate that 32 percent of all undiscovered oil in the United 
States may be located beneath the OCS.5 Experts predict that OCS 
resources can be utilized to satisfy in part the country's energy needs 
until production of alternative energy sources such as oil shale, solar, 
geothermal, coal gasification and liquification, and other energy 
forms becomes feasible and economically realistic on a large scale. 6 
In spite of its potential as an energy source, only a fraction of the 
OCS has ever been leased for oil and gas development. The portion of 
the OCS extending seaward to a depth of 200 meters comprises ap-
proximately 528 million acres.1 Since 1953, only 17.9 million of the 
528 million acres, less than 4 percent, have ever been leased.8 Only 
10.3 million acres, about 2 percent of the total, were under lease at 
the end of 1979.9 However, the oil and gas recovered from the OCS 
represents approximately 17 percent of all domestic oil and gas pro-
duced.10 
OCS development was accelerated in response to the energy crisis. 
In January, 1974, President Nixon ordered the Secretary of the In-
terior to lease 10 million OCS acres in 1975, more than triple the 
acreage scheduled for leasing in that year.11 Proposals for more 
energy facilities,12 many of which would be located in coastal areas, 
4. See H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 1450,1460. The term "outer continental shelf" is statutorily defined to in-
clude "all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area of lands beneath navigable 
waters [title to which is confirmed unto the coastal states] and of which the subsoil and seabed 
appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control." 43 U .S.C. S 1331 
(a) (1976). The definition of the seaward OCS boundary is open-ended. The OCS extends 
seaward to a depth of 200 meters "or beyond that limit to where the depth of the superadja-
cent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources." Law of the Sea: Convention 
on the Continental Shelf, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578 (Apr. 29, 1958). See Jackson, Ra-
tional Development o/Outer Continental SkelfOil and Gas, 54 ORE. L. REv. 567, 570 (1975). 
For a discussion of the history and scope of federal and state jurisdiction over offshore lands, 
see note 79 infra. 
5. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT. U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR. FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL 1M· 
PACT STATEMENT. PRoPOSED 1981 OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE OFF· 
SHORE CENTRAL AND NORTHERN CALlFORNIA OCS SALE No. 53, 1-1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 
FEIS]. 
6. H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 1450, 1460. 
7. API REPORT. supra note 3, at 44. See note 4 supra. 
8. [d. 
9. [d. 
10. H.R. REp. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st. Sess. 74 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 1450, 1481. 
11. 10 WEEKLY COMPo OF PRES. Doc. 72, 83-84 (Jan. 28, 1974). 
12. The term "energy facilities" has been statutorily defined to include any equipment or 
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accompanied the OCS leasing acceleration order. It soon became ap-
parent that this course of action, without proper safeguards, could 
have devastating ecological effects on state coastal areas. 13 Several 
years of congressional activity14 culminated in amendments to the 
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 (CZMA)15 and the Outer Con-
tinental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 (OCSLA).16 These amendments 
were designed to balance the need for increased energy self-suffi-
ciency with environmental protection. The CZMA and the OCSLA 
each have a major influence on OCS development; however, the two 
laws have differing priorities. 
The OCSLA 17 governs the leasing of the OCS. This Act delegates 
the authority to administer the OCS leasing process to the Secretary 
of the Interior.1s From its inception in 1953 the law remained virtual-
facility which is or will be used primarily-
(A) in the exploration for, or the development, production, conversion, storage, 
transfer, processing, or transportation of any energy resource; or 
(B) for the manufacture, production, or assembly of equipment, machinery, prod-
ucts, or devices which are involved in any activity described in subparagraph (A). 
The term includes, but is not limited to (i) electric generating plants; (ii) petroleum 
refineries and associated facilities; (iii) gasification plants; (iv) facilities for the 
transportation, conversion, treatment, transfer, or storage of liquified natural gas; 
(v) uranium enrichment or nuclear fuel processing facilities; (vi) oil and gas facilities, 
including platforms, assembly plants, storage depots, tank farms, crew and supply 
bases, and refining complexes; (vii) facilities including deepwater ports, for the 
transfer of petroleum; (viii) pipelines and transmission facilities; and (ix) terminals 
which are associated with any of the foregoing. 
16 U.S.C. § 1453 (5) (1976). 
13. See generally Joint Hearings Before the Senate Committees on Interior and Insular Ai 
fairs and Commerce on Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments and Coastal Zone 
Management Act Amendments, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Hearings on Outer Continental 
Shelf Oil and Gas Extraction and Environmental, Economic and Social Impact Upon the 
Coastal Zone Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). 
The Santa Barbara Oil Spill resulted from a major blowout at an offshore oil drilling project 
in the Santa Barbara Channel in January, 1969. The damage caused to the ecology of the chan-
nel provided a graphic example of the reality of the threat posed by OCS development to 
coastal areas. See H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 74 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1450, 1481; R. EASTON. BLACK TIDE: THE SANTA BARBARA OIL SPILL 
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1972); C. STEINHART & J. STEINHART. BLOWOUT: A CASE STUDY OF THE 
SANTA BARBARA OIL SPILL (1972). 
14. See CZMA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 577-80; H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 95-100 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1450, 
1501-07. 
15. Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-370, 90 Stat. 1013 
(1976) (amending 16 U.S.C. S§ 1451-1464). 
16. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 
629 (1978) (amending 43 U.S.C. SS 1331-1343). 
17. Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462 (1953) (codified at 43 U.S.C. SS 1331-1356 (1976 & 
Supp. III 1979». 
18. 43 U.S.C. S 1334(a) (Supp. III 1979). 
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ly unchanged19 until it was substantially amended in 1978.20 The 
basic purpose of the amendments was to modernize the administra-
tive policies and provisions of the federal OCS leasing program to 
achieve the goal of rapid and orderly development of OCS resources, 
and at the same time to delineate standards to insure consideration 
of environmental factors throughout the leasing process.21 Closely 
related to the mandated recognition of environmental concerns was 
section 19 of the OCSLA, which established procedures for coordina-
tion and consultation between the Department of the Interior and 
the governors of affected coastal states.22 Section 19 guaranteed 
that the states would have input into the decision-making aspects of 
proposed lease sales which would impact their coastal areas.23 
While the OCSLA requires consideration of environmental factors 
as an aspect of the OCS leasing process, the CZMA24 in contrast ad-
dresses the protection of the coastal environment as its primary con-
cern.25 The CZMA was enacted in response to increasing public con-
cern for the need to protect coastal areas from the destruction of 
wetlands and beaches which was occurring as a result of the in-
creased use of coastline areas for industrial, residential, and recrea-
tional purposes.26 Congress felt that the states should assume more 
responsibility for protecting the fragile structure of coastal areas 
from the competing demands being placed upon its limited resources. 
The CZMA was designed, therefore, to "encourage the states to ex-
ercise their full authority over the lands and waters in the coastal 
zone."27 
19. Section 19(f) of the Deepwater Port Act of 1975 amended section 4(a) (2) of the OCSLA 
and provided that with respect to OCS activities, present state law controls, rather than state 
law in force in 1953 when the OCSLA was enacted. Pub. L. No. 93-627,88 Stat. 2126 (1975) 
(codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1976); 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (2) (1976». 
20. See note 16 supra. 
21. H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 53, 121-22 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1450, 1460, 1528-29. 
22. 43 U.S.C. § 1345 (Supp. III 1979). 
23. H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 152-53 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 1450,1458-59. 
24. Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976» 
(amended 1980). 
25. See API V. Knecht, 456 F. Supp. 886, 919 (C.D. Cal. 1978), afrd, 609 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 
1979). "Although sensitive to balancing competing interests, [the CZMA is] first and foremost 
a statute directed to and solicitous of environmental concerns." 456 F. Supp. at 919. 
26. S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972), reprinted in CZMA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 1, at 194. 
27. S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1972), reprinted in CZMA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 1, at 197-98; 16 U.S.C. S 1451(h) (1976). The CZMA defines the term "coastal zone" 
to encompass: 
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The CZMA establishes a voluntary process whereby the coastal 
states are encouraged to develop comprehensive coastal manage-
ment programs.28 The CZMA provides several incentives to induce 
states to participate. Two types of federal funding are made avail-
able.29 In addition, once a coastal management program is approved 
The coastal waters (including the lands therein and thereunder) and the adjacent 
shorelands (including the waters therein and thereunder), strongly influenced by each 
other and in proximity to the shorelines of the several coastal states, and includes 
islands, transitional and intertidal areas, salt marshes, wetlands, and beaches. The 
zone extends, in the Great Lakes waters to the international boundary between the 
United States and Canada and, in other areas, seaward to the outer limit of the 
United States territorial sea. The zone extends inland from the shorelines only to the 
extent necessary to control shorelands, the uses of which have a direct and significant 
impact on the coastal waters. Excluded from the coastal zone are lands the use of 
which is by law subject solely to the discretion of or which is held in trust by the 
Federal Government, its officers or agents. 
16 U.S.C. § 1453(1) (1976). 
28. The basic requirement of a coastal management program is the preparation of a com-
prehensive land use plan for the state's coastal area, which designates and mandates the pro-
tection of critical areas. See Schoenbaum & Rosenburg, The Legal Implementation of Coastal 
Zone Management: The North Carolina Model, [1976] DUKE L. J.1. The CZMA defines the 
term "management program" as "a comprehensive statement in words, maps, illustrations or 
other media of communication, prepared and adopted by the state in accordance with the pro-
visions of this Chapter, setting forth objectives, policies, and standards to guide public and 
private uses of lands and waters in the coastal zone." 16 U.S.C. § 1453(11) (1976). 
The CZMA's definition of the term "coastal zone," see note 27 supra, includes one con-
troversial exception. Section 304(1) provides that the coastal zone does not include lands "the 
use of which is by law subject solely to the discretion of or which is held in trust by the Federal 
Government, its officers or agents." 16 U.S.C. § 1453(1) (1976). Therefore, federal lands such 
as military bases, national forests, and national parks are not subject to the requirements of a 
state coastal management program. States have argued that since federally controlled lands 
often represent a significant portion of a state's coastline, the exclusion of federal lands from 
the requirements of the CZMA undermines coastal planning efforts. See, e.g., Shapiro, Coastal 
Zone Management and Excluded Federal Lands: The Viability of Continued Federalism in the 
Management of Federal Coastlands, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1011, 1013 (1979). 
29. The CZMA provides grants in aid to defray the costs of implementing a coastal manage-
ment program. 16 U.S.C. § 1454 (1976). An established state program qualifies for additional 
funding for operational costs after it is approved by the Department of Commerce. Id. § 1455. 
However, prior to granting approval of a coastal management program, the Secretary of Com-
merce must find that it satisfies a number of guidelines set forth in the CZMA which regulate 
the nature and content of the coastal program and the power of the state agency charged with 
its administration. Id. §§ 1455(c)-1455(e). 
The state must provide federal agencies with an opportunity for full participation in a state's 
program development, and must demonstrate to Commerce that the views of the principally 
affected federal agencies have been adequately considered in the program. Id. § 
1455(c)-1455(e). This provision insures that a coastal program addresses national concerns as 
well as those of state and local governments. 41 Fed. :Reg. 42,879 (1976). As of the end of 1980, 
the Department of Commerce had approved coastal programs for twenty-five of the thirty-five 
eligible states and territories which represent 78 percent of the United States coastline. 126 
CONGo REC. HlO,l11 (daily ed. Sept. 30,1980) (remarks of Rep. Studds). 
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by the Department of Commerce, section 307 of the CZMA, which 
contains what are commonly known as the federal consistency provi-
sions, requires that federal agencies conform their activities with the 
provisions of that state's coastal management program.30 
With regard to OCS development, conflicts exist in the policy 
directives of the CZMA and the OCSLA.31 The avowed objective of 
the CZMA is to "protect and give high priority to the natural 
systems in the coastal zone."32 The 1980 amendments to the CZMA33 
expand the Act's statement of national coastal policy but retain the 
original language of the overall goal "to preserve, protect, develop 
and where possible to restore and enhance the resources of the Na-
tion's coastal zone."34 Little mention is made of the need to accom-
30. 16 U.S.C. S 1456(c) (1976). See text at notes 38-40 infra. 
31. See Schaffer, OCS Development and the Consistency Prwisions of the Coastal Zone 
Management Act-A Legal and Policy Analysis, 4 N. OHIO L. REV. 595, 604 (1976). However, 
the policy conflict is now less dramatic than that depicted by Ms. Schaffer, in view of the en-
vironmental safeguards added to the OCSLA by the 1978 amendments. See text at notes 
84-103 infra. 
32. 16 U.S.C. S 1451(g) (1976). 
33. Pub. L. No. 96-464, 94 Stat. 2060 (1980) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. S 1452). 
34. Section 303 of the CZMA was amended to provide specific policies to give states 
guidance in the implementation and improvement of state coastal management plans. H.R. 
REP. No. 1012, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1980). Section 303, as amended, provides that it is 
the national coastal policy: 
(1) to preserve, protect, develop, and where possible, to restore or enhance, the 
resources of the Nation's coastal zone for this and succeeding generations; 
(2) to encourage and assist the states to exercise effectively their responsibilities in 
the coastal zone through the development and implementation of management pro-
grams to achieve wise use of the land and water resources of the coastal zone, giving 
full consideration to ecological, cultural, historic, and esthetic values as well as to 
needs for economic development, which programs should at least provide for-
(A) the protection of natural resources, including wetlands, floodplains, 
estuaries, beaches, dunes, barrier islands, coral reefs, and fish and wildlife and their 
habitat, within the coastal zone, 
(B) the management of coastal development to minimize the loss of life and prop-
erty caused by improper development in flood-prone, storm surge, geological hazard, 
and erosion-prone areas and in areas of subsidence and saltwater intrusion, and by 
the destruction of natural protective features such as beaches, dunes, wetlands, and 
barrier islands, 
(C) priority consideration being given to coastal-dependent uses and orderly 
processes for siting major facilities related to national defense, energy, fisheries 
development, recreation, ports and transportation, and the location, to the maximum 
extent practicable, of new commercial and industrial developments in or adjacent to 
areas where such development already exists, 
(D) public access to the coasts for recreation purposes, 
(E) assistance in the redevelopment of deteriorating urban waterfronts and 
ports, and sensitive preservation and restoration of historic, cultural, and esthetic 
coastal features, 
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modate the demands of energy development; the CZMA simply pro-
vides that the states must give consideration to economic develop-
ment and the national interest in energy facility siting in their coast-
al management programs.35 
In contrast, the basic purpose of the OCSLA is to accelerate OCS 
leasing, in order to make its resources available to meet domestic 
energy needs as rapidly as possible.36 The requisite consideration of 
environmental factors appears to be significantly less stringent than 
the policy directives of the CZMA. Although the OCSLA attempts to 
harmonize OCS development and environmental protection, the 
decisions which address these concerns are left largely to the discre-
tion of the Secretary of the Interior. Moreover, the Secretary's deci-
sions are reviewed deferentially by the courts. 
In view of the divergent interests involved, it was probably inevi-
table that a conflict would arise between the administrator of the 
stepped-up OCS development program authorized by the OCSLA 
and an administrator of a state coastal program charged with pro-
tecting the unique and valuable resources of coastal areas. Such a 
dispute has arisen between the Department of the Interior and the 
California Coastal Commission which administers the California 
Coastal Zone Management Program,37 the most comprehensive 
(F) the coordination and simplification of procedures in order to ensure ex-
pedited governmental decision-making for the management of coastal resources, 
(G) continued consultation and coordination with, and the giving of adequate con-
sideration to the views of, affected Federal agencies, 
(H) the giving of timely and effective notification of, and opportunities for public 
and local government participation in, coastal management decisionmaking, and 
(I) assistance to support comprehensive planning, conservation, and manage-
ment for living marine resources, including planning for the siting of pollution control 
and aquaculture facilities within the coastal zone, and improved coordination between 
State and Federal coastal zone management agencies and State and wildlife agencies; 
and 
(3) to encourage the preparation of special area management plans which provide 
for increased specificity in protecting significant natural resources, reasonable 
coastal-dependent economic growth. improved protection of life and property in 
hazardous areas, and improved predictability in governmental decision making; and 
(4) to encourage the participation and cooperation of the public, state and local 
governments, and interstate and other regional agencies, as well as of the Federal 
agencies having programs affecting the coastal zone, in carrying out the purposes of 
this title. 
Pub. L. No. 96-464, 94 Stat. 2060 (1980) (to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1452). 
35. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1452, 1454(b)(8) (1976) (amended 1980). 
36. H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1977), reprinted in [1978) U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 1450, 1460. 
37. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West. 1977 & Supp. 1980). For a discussion of the 
history and structure of the California coastal management program, see note 123 infra. 
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coastal legislation enacted by a state. Lease Sale No. 48 which leased 
tracts off southern California in 1979 and Lease Sale No. 53 which 
leased tracts off northern California in May, 1981, have provided the 
focal points for the dispute. At issue has been the applicability of the 
federal consistency requirements of the CZMA to the activities con-
ducted by the Department of the Interior prior to these lease sales. 
This article will analyze the effectiveness of the procedures cur-
rently available for state review of the OCS leasing process under 
the CZMA and the OCSLA. First, the federal consistency provisions 
will be discussed with focus on section 307(c)(1) of the CZMA. This 
will be followed by an examination of the scope of the authority 
vested in the federal and state sectors which has resulted from ad-
ministrative interpretation of section 307(c)(1). Second, a description 
of the current OCS pre-lease sale procedures as set forth in the 
OCSLA and the various opportunities for state review of the terms 
of a lease sale will be presented. The dispute between the Depart-
ment of the Interior and California over the applicability of section 
307(c) (1) to Interior's pre-lease activities will be examined in detail 
to illustrate the practical problems with state review of OCS lease 
sales under the present statutory scheme. Finally, a solution to the 
statutory interpretation problem created by section 307(c)(1) will be 
suggested. 
II. FEDERAL CONSISTENCY UNDER THE CZMA 
A. The Five Consistency Provisions 
Department of Commerce approval of a coastal management pro-
gram triggers the requirements of the federal consistency provisions 
of the CZMA.38 The effect of these provisions is to give states lever-
age over federal activities within or affecting the coastal zone by re-
quiring that certain types of federal actions be conducted in a man-
ner which is consistent with the provisions of the state coastal man-
agement program. 
The five consistency provisions subject the following federal ac-
tions to consistency review: (1) federal activities conducted or sup-
ported which directly affect the coastal zone; (2) federal development 
projects in the coastal zone; (3) activities of applicants for federal li-
38. H.R. REP. No. 1049, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in CZMA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 1, at 323. 
The following matrix diagram sets forth the basic requirements and distinguishing features of the five federal con-
sistency provisions including the types of federal actions subject to consistency review, the different threshold impacts re-
quired to trigger the consistency provisions, the delegation of decision-making authority for the determination of con-
sistency between the federal agencies and the states and procedures for administrative resolution of conflicts. 
CZMA Section 307(c)(1) 307(c)(2) 307(c)(3)(A) 307(c)(3)(B) 307(d) I 
Federal Action Direct federal Federal develop- Federally licensed Federally licensed Federal assistance 
activities ment projects and permitted ac- and permitted ac- to state and local 
tivities tivities described governments 
in detail in OCS 
plans 
Coastal Zone .. Directly affecting .. In the coastal .. Affecting land or .. Affecting any "Affecting the 
Impact the coastal zone" zone" water uses in the land use or water coastal zone" 
coastal zone" use in the coastal 
zone" 
Consistency Consistent to the Consistent to the Consistent with Consistent with Consistent with 
requirement maximum extent maximum extent the CZM Program the CZM Program the CZM Program 
practicable with practicable with 
CZM Program CZM Program 
Consistency Made by federal Made by federal Made by state Made by state Made by state 
determination agency (review by agency (review by agency agency agency 
state agency) state agency) 
Federal agency Federal agency Federal agency Federal agency Federal agency Federal agency 
responsibility not required to not required to may not approve may not approve may not grant 
following a disapprove action disapprove action license or permit federal licenses or assistance follow-
disagreement following state following state following state permits described ing state agency 
agency disagree- agency disagree- agency objection in detail in the objection 
ment (unless judi- ment (unless judi- OCS plan follow-
cially impelled to cially impelled to ing state agency 
do so) do so) objection 
Administrative Voluntary media- Voluntary media- Appeal to the Appeal to the Appeal to the 
Conflict tion by the tion by the Secretary of Com- Secretary of Com- Secretary of Com-
resolution Secretary of Secretary of merce by appli- merce by person merce by appli-
Commerce Commerce cant or independ- or independent cant agency or in-
ent Secretarial Secretarial review dependent 
review I Secretarial review I 
Modified version of NOAA Matrix Diagram 42 Fed. Reg. 43,586 (1977). 
For comprehensive discussions of the federal consistency provisions and the CZMA generally, see Symposium, Legal 
Aspects of Coastal Zone Management, 10 NAT. RES. L. 207 (1977); Finnell, The Federal Regulatory Role in Coastal Land 
Management, AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 169 (1978); Schoenbaum & Parker, Federalism in the Coastal Zone: Three 
Models of State Jurisdiction and Control, 57 N.C. L. REV. 231, 238 (1979); Note, Application of the Federal Consistency 
Provisions to Outer Continental Shelf Leasing, 2 STAN. ENVT'L L. ANN. 144 (1979). 
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In order for a federal activity to become subject to consistency 
review under section 307 of the CZMA, it must cause a certain effect 
on the coastal zone. Each of the five consistency provisions contains 
slightly different language to describe its threshold requirement. 40 
However, neither the CZMA nor its legislative history gives any in-
dication as to the substantive differences between the threshold 
tests, if in fact any were intended. This article will focus on the inter-
pretation of the phrase "directly affecting the coastal zone," which is 
the threshold test for federal activities under section 307(c)(1). 
B. The Application of Section 307(c)(l) to a Proposed 
Federal Activity 
Section 307(c) (1) ofthe CZMA provides that "[e]ach Federal agen-
cy conducting or supporting activities directly affecting the coastal 
zone shall conduct or support those activities in a manner which is, to 
the maximum extent practicable, consistent with approved state 
management programs. "41 "Federal activity" is defined in the regu-
lations to mean "any function performed by or on behalf of the 
Federal agency in the exercise of its statutory responsibilities."42 
The federal agency makes an initial determination as to whether 
its activity has a "direct effect" on the state coastal zone.43 The 
federal agency must evaluate its activity in light of the objectives, 
40. Thus, a federal activity must have a "direct effect" on the coastal zone for purposes of 
section 307(c)(1). A federal development project "in" the coastal zone is subject to consistency 
review under section 307(c)(2). Applicants for federal licenses or permits must provide con-
sistency determinations under section 307(c)(3)(A) where the proposed activity "affects land 
or water uses in the coastal zone." OCS post-lease sale activities "affecting any land use or 
water use" in the coastal zone are subject to consistency review under section 307(c)(3)(B). 
Finally, before a state or local project which will "affect" the coastal zone can receive federal 
funding, it must be reviewed for consistency under section 307(d). 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)-1456(d) 
1976). 
41. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (1976). The phrase "to the maximum extent practicable," seem-
ingly a large loophole for a federal agency which is unwilling to comply with section 307(c)(1), 
is strictly limited by administrative interpretation. The CZMA regulations define the phrase to 
require full consistency unless compliance is prohibited by existing law or unless unforeseen 
circumstances present a substantial obstacle. 15 C.F.R. § 930.32 (1979). Therefore, barring ex-
treme, unforeseen circumstances, a federal activity subject to section 307(c)(1) must comply 
with the provisions, unless compliance would violate a federal or state law. 
42. 15 C.F.R. § 930.31(a) (1979). NOAA's comment to this section explains that "Federal ac-
tivity" under section 307(c)(1) is intended to be a "residual category" to cover federal actions 
which are neither development projects nor related to permitting and licensing procedures. 44 
Fed. Reg. 37,146 (1979) (comment to 15 C.F.R. § 930.31 (1979». NOAA further states that 
federal OCS pre-lease activities are subject to the requirements of section 307(c)(1). Id. at 
37,154. 
43. 15 C.F.R. § 930.33(a) (1979). 
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policies, and standards of the state's coastal management program.44 
If the federal agency determines that the activity in question will 
have a "direct effect" on the coastal zone, it must then provide to the 
administrator of the state coastal program a formal notification, 
called a consistency determination, that the activity will be carried 
out in a manner which conforms with the state program.45 The state 
has forty-five days in which to review the consistency determination 
and inform the federal agency of its agreement or objections.46 The 
state may obtain a fifteen-day extension of the response periodY 
However, even if the sixty-day period lapses, the federal agency may 
not give final approval to the activity for a period of ninety days from 
the date on which it submitted the consistency determination.48 
If a federal agency determines that its proposed activity has no 
"direct effect" on a state's coastal zone, it must provide the state 
with written notice of that conclusion. Such a notice is called a 
"negative determination."49 In the event that the state and federal 
agencies disagree as to the propriety of a "negative determination" 
or the validity of a consistency determination, either party may re-
quest the Secretary of Commerce to mediate the dispute. 50 
The legislative history applicable to section 307(c)(1) provides little 
indication of what Congress intended in establishing the "directly af-
fecting" threshold test for consistency determinations. The text of 
the provision as passed by the House of Representatives51 and the 
Senate52 stated that all federal activities "in the coastal zone" were 
subject to section 307(c)(1). The Conference Committee altered the 
language, without explanation, and substituted "directly affecting" 
44. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,590 (1977). A coastal management program must include a list of 
federal actions which the state believes are most likely to affect the coastal zone. 15 C.F.R. S 
930.35 (1979). This requirement is designed to aid the federal agency in making its initial 
determination. [d. 
45. 15 C.F.R. S 930.34(a) (1979). A consistency determination should include a brief state-
ment certifying to the consistency of the proposed activity based on the relevant portions of 
the coastal management program. The consistency determination' should also contain a de-
tailed description of the activity, its associated facilities, and the anticipated coastal zone ef-
fects.[d. S 930.39. 
46. [d. S 930.41(a). 
47. [d. S 930.41(b). 
48. [d. S 930.41(c). 
49. [d. S 930.35(d). 
50. [d. S 930.110-.116. See note 146 infra. 
51. H.R. REP. No. 1049, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972), reprinted in CZMA LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 309. 
52. S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1972), reprinted in CZMA LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 242. 
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for "in."63 The effect of the substitution seems both to expand and 
contract the scope of the provision. Activities which take place out-
side of the coastal zone, but nevertheless have a "direct effect," such 
as OCS activities, are subject to consistency review. On the other 
hand, an activity in the coastal zone is not subject to consistency 
review unless its effect is direct. It seems most likely that the change 
was an attempt to streamline the provision to make its application 
more efficient. The "directly affecting" language ensures that all 
major federal actions will be reviewed, while minor federal actions 
with little or no effect on the coastal zone, even though within its 
boundaries, need not be reviewed. 
C. Administrative Interpretation of Section 307(c)(1) 
The CZMA delegates the authority to administer the Act to the 
Department of Commerce.64 An Assistant Administrator in the Na-
tional Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), a subdivi-
sion of the Department of Commerce, enforces the CZMA through 
the Office of Coastal Zone Management, a subdivision of NOAA. 66 
The statutory language of section 307(c)(1) is cursory and am-
biguous.66 NOAA was required, therefore, to resolve critical inter-
pretation problems concerning the practical application of the provi-
sion, and in particular the scope of the authority which Congress in-
tended to vest in the federal agencies and states with respect to the 
determination of consistency. One key issue left unanswered in the 
statutory text is whether the federal or state agency should decide 
whether a federal activity "directly affects" the coastal zone, and 
make the determination of consistency when a "direct effect" is 
found. The broad language of section 307(c)(1) gives no indication of 
what Congress intended. 67 
53. CONF. REp. No. 1544, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 15 (1972), reprinted in CZMA LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 450, 457. 
54. 16 U.S.C. S 1463 (1976). 
55. 15 C.F.R. S 923.2(b) (1979); see OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT, OCZM FACTS 
(May, 1975); Note, Application of the Federal Consistency Provisions to Outer Continental 
Shelf Leasing, 2 STAN. ENVT'L L. ANN. 145-46 (1979). 
56. During the 1980 Oversight Hearings held before the House Subcommittee on 
Oceanography, Chairman Gerry E. Studds remarked, "I reread the statute several times ver-
batim, which is something none ought to be condemned to do, and I think particularly that sec-
tions 307 and 308 challenge anyone whose native tongue is English to discern what Congress 
had in mind when it wrote those sections." Proposed Amendments to the Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act: Hearings on H.R. 6956, H.R. 6979 before the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the 
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 88 (1980) 
[hereinafter cited as 1980 Oversight Hearings]. 
57. The legislative history is ambiguous. The Senate bill, as passed, provided that "Federal 
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With little guidance, but under considerable pressure from the 
federal sector,58 NOAA interpreted the statute to give the federal 
agencies the authority to determine consistency. 59 Not surprisingly, 
this decision has not gone uncriticized. The National Advisory Com-
mittee on Oceans and Atmosphere (NACOA)60 has argued strongly 
that the states rather than the federal agencies should properly 
determine consistency.61 During the hearings on the 1980 reauthori-
zation of the CZMA, NACOA proposed an amendment to section 
307(c)(1) which would shift the authority for determining consisten-
cy to the stateS.62 However, the proposal received little positive re-
sponse, and did not reach the floor of either house of Congress.63 
agencies shall not undertake any development project in the coastal zone of a coastal state 
which, in the opinion of the coastal state is inconsistent . ... " S. 3507, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 
§ 314 (1972), reprinted in CZMA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 242 (emphasis added). 
In the parallel provision the House bill did not expressly address the issue, and gives no indica-
tion as to who should determine consistency. H.R. REP. No. 14146, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. S 307 
(1972), reprinted in CZMA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 309. The Conference Com-
mittee adopted the House version, without explanation. CONF. REP. No. 1544, 92d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 8 (1972), reprinted in CZMA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 450. 
58. See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, EIGHTH ANNUAL 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 11-7 (June 30, 1979) [hereinafter cited as NACOA 
REPORT]. 
59. 41 Fed. Reg. 42,877, 48,880 (1976). "There were a number of comments regarding the 
question of where initial responsibility rested with respect to making the consistency deter-
mination for Federal activities including projects. NOAA construes the Act as imposing this 
responsibility on the Federal agencies, and the proposed regulations reflect this view." [d. 
60. NACOA is an organization charged with maintaining a "continuing review" of national 
coastal policy and coastal zone management, and advising the Secretary of Commerce with 
respect to carrying out the various programs administered by NOAA. 33 U.S.C. S 857-13-15 
(Supp. III 1979). 
61. NACOA REPORT, supra note 58, at 11-6 to 11-11. NACOA contends that the CZMA legis-
lative history supports its view. [d. at 11-6. See note 57 supra. NACOA suggests that the Con-
ference Committee's unexplained adoption of the inexplicit House language over the Senate 
language was not intended to be an express rejection of state authority to determine consisten-
cy. NACOA REPORT, supra note 58, at 11-6. However, an equally plausible argument can be 
made that since Congress explicitly gave the states the authority to determine consistency 
under section 307(c)(3)(A), the fact that Congress did not include the same language in section 
307(c)(1) indicates a different intent as to the arbiter of consistency under the latter provision. 
62. Coastal Zone Management and Marine Sanctuaries Reauthorization Hearings before 
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 
(1979). The amendment would have required the federal agency to submit an environmental 
impact statement together with a certification of consistency to the state agency. The state 
would then make the determination of consistency. [d. 
63. During the 1980 Oversight Hearings before the House Subcommittee on Oceanography, 
Representative Hughs commented on the proposed NACOA amendment: "I think it would be 
somewhat unrealistic to believe that this Congress or this administration, or even future ad-
ministrations, would give the ultimate decision to the States in some of these important deci-
sions that have to be made in the years ahead." 1980 Oversight Hearings, supra note 56, at 
177. 
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A second key-issue left open by the ambiguous language of section 
307(c)(1) is whether Congress intended that a federal agency be able 
to proceed with its activity when the state and federal agency dis-
agree on a negative determination or a consistency determination. 
The legislative history is silent on this issue. Section 307(c)(1) states 
that a federal activity with "direct effects" on the coastal zone must 
be conducted in a manner which is consistent with an approved state 
program64 and one could therefore infer that a proposed federal ac-
tivity which does not conform with the requirements of the state pro-
gram cannot be implemented. However, this provision as interpreted 
by NOAA is not self-effecting. NOAA's regulations provide that 
when a state objects to a federal agency's consistency determination, 
neither the Department of Commerce nor the state has the authority 
to halt the federal activity.65 Therefore, in order to stop a federal ac-
tivity which the state believes is inconsistent with its coastal pro-
gram, the state must seek a preliminary injunction and litigate the 
consistency issue.66 
Although it has been frequently stated that the consistency provi-
sions are intended to give states leverage over federal actions,67 sec-
tion 307(c)(1) appears to afford little. Section 307(c)(1) can at most be 
viewed as a non-binding procedure for state input of information. 
NOAA's regulations resolve the ambiguities of the statutory text 
decisively in favor of the federal agencies. As a result, any "lever-
age" is greatly diluted by administrative interpretation of the stat-
ute. It would appear that the statute as interpreted is at odds with 
Congress' expressed intent "to enhance State authority by encour-
aging and assisting the States to assume planning and regulatory 
powers over their coastal zones."68 However, it does not appear like-
64. 16 U.S.C. S 1456(c)(l) (1976). See text at note 41 supra. 
65. See 43 Fed. Reg. 10,509, 10,513 (1978). "A number of States reiterated their argument 
that Federal agencies should be required by regulation to suspend action on Federal activities 
in the event of a State objection. NOAA has rejected this argument on the basis that the act 
does not mandate the recommended suspension." Id. 
66. Of course, the state would bear the burden of proof in these proceedings. "[I]ronically 
this is the program which is to be an incentive for states, [and] the burden of proof is still on the 
states." National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere, Transcript of Ocean Use 
Panel Meeting 45 (July 21, 1978). 
67. See, e.g., S. REp. No. 277, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (11ft:», reprinted in CZMA 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 735; S. REP. No. 783, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.l0-11 (1980); 
Finnell, The Federal Regulatory Role in Coastal Land Management, AM. B. FOUNDATION 
RESEARCH J. 173, 249 (1978); Note, Coastal Zone Impru;ts of Offshore Oil and Gas Develop-
ment: An Accommodation Through the California Coastal Act of 1976, 8 PAC. L. J. 783 (1977). 
68. S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972), reprinted in CZMA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 1, at 193. 
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ly that Congress will alter the present interpretive scheme of section 
307(c)(1).69 
Only those federal activities with a "direct effect" on the coastal 
zone must comply with section 307(c)(1). The question of what con-
stitutes a "direct effect" and thereby triggers the consistency re-
quirement has presented considerable difficulty. NOAA has strug-
gled since 1976 to provide a workable interpretation for section 
307(c)(1)'s threshold test, and the regulations applicable to the 
"directly affecting" language have undergone a series of changes. In 
1977, NOAA attempted in proposed regulations to supply individual 
definitions for the threshold standards of each of the consistency 
provisions.70 However, NOAA's final regulations, issued in 1978, 
adopted a uniform threshold test for applying the consistency re-
quirement to all five types of federal action. Under the uniform 
definition all federal activities "significantly affecting" the coastal 
zone were subject to consistency review. 71 
69. See note 63 supra. 
70. NOAA issued the first proposed regulations on September 28, 1976. 41 Fed. Reg. 
42,878-79 (1976). NOAA did not define "directly affecting," but stated that the regulations 
would adopt the "causal" terms of the act. "[T]hese terms will speak for themselves and dif-
ficulties will be addressed on a case by case basis." Id. at 42,880. 
In a second set of proposed regulations issued on August 29, 1977, NOAA supplied in-
dividual defmitions for the threshold tests of the five consistency provisions, in response to 
comments requesting clarification of the statutory language. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,585, 43,590-91 
(1977). NOAA provided a comprehensive interpretation of section 307(c)(1)'s "directly affect-
ing" test: 
(a) The term "directly affecting the coastal zone" describes the coastal zone effect 
caused by a Federal activity which is sufficient to trigger Federal agency responsibili-
ty for making a consistency determination and notifying the State agency of such 
determination. 
(b) A Federal activity will directly affect the coastal zone if the activity causes 
significant (i) changes in the manner in which waters, lands or other coastal zone 
resources are used, (ii) limitations on the range of uses of coastal zone resources, or 
(iii) changes in the quality of coastal zone resources. The significance of the effect on 
the coastal zone shall be considered in terms of the primary, secondary and cumula-
tive consequences of the activity. A Federal activity which causes significant changes 
in or limitations on coastal zone resources directly affects the coastal zone even when 
the activity causes both beneficial and detrimental effects, and on balance the Federal 
agency determines that the effect will be beneficial. 
Id. at 43,598. 
After noting that a precise definition of "directly affecting" would be "impossible to 
develop," NOAA drew an analogy between the section 307(c)(l) standard and the threshold 
test for effects on the coastal zone which Congress considered when it formulated the bound-
aries for the coastal zone. Id. at 43,590. Congress included within the meaning of the term 
"coastal zone" those "shorelands the use of which have a 'direct impact' on coastal waters." 
Id. Congress indicated that "the phrase 'direct impact' is intended to include only those im-
pacts of a 'significant' nature." Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, NOAA considered it ap-
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In 1979, NOAA's interpretation of "directly affecting" was 
changed once again, this time in response to a legal opinion issued by 
the Department of Justice which rejected NOAA's uniform "signifi-
cantly affecting" test.72 The opinion stated that there was not suffi-
cient justification in the legislative history of the CZMA or elsewhere 
for eliminating the statutory distinctions between the provisions. 73 
The Department of Justice concluded that the plain language of the 
statute should control, and that with respect to section 307(c) 
(1), the "directly affecting" test should be applied on a case-by-case 
basis and determined as a question of fact.74 The current NOAA 
propriate to adopt a "significance" standard to define "directly affecting." [d. NOAA 
modelled its definition for "directly affecting" on the Council on Environmental Quality's 
Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. Part 1508 (1978), which delineate the threshold requirements for the 
preparation of environmental impact statements under the National Environmental Policy 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4347 (1976) (NEPA). 42 Fed. Reg. 43,585, 43,590 (1977). NEPA re-
quires the preparation of an environmental impact statement for "major Federal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment .... " 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2XC) 
(1976). NOAA's comment stressed the similarity between the "directly affecting" test of the 
CZMA and the "significantly affecting" test of NEP A, as justification for patterning the sec-
tion 307(c)(1) standard after the NEPA standard. 42 Fed. Reg. 43,590 (1977). 
71. 43 Fed. Reg. 10,510-11 (1978). The uniform definition, patterned on NEPA's threshold 
test, applied to all five federal consistency provisions. Under this test a federal activity 
triggered the applicable consistency provision when it caused "significant" effects on the state 
coastal zone. 
Under the uniform definition, an effect was "direct" when it caused significant: 
(1) Changes in the manner in which land, water, or other coastal zone natural 
resources are used; 
(2) Limitations on the range of uses of coastal zone natural resources; or 
(3) Changes in the quality of coastal zone natural resources. 
[d. at 10,519. 
The regulations further provided that: 
[d. 
The significance of the changes or limitations caused by the Federal action must be 
considered in terms of the primary, secondary, and cumulative effects on the coastal 
zone. A Federal action which causes significant changes in or limitations on coastal 
zone natural resources meets the requirements of this section even when the action 
causes both beneficial and adverse coastal zone effects and, on balance, the effects 
are determined to be beneficial. 
NOAA justified its deviation from the statutory distinctions in the threshold tests "[i]n light 
of the similarity among the various definitions, and in view of the legislative history which sup-
ports the 'significance' test." NOAA stated that "[t]he legislative history is replete" with 
statements indicating that Congress did not intend to create separate requirements for each 
subsection, and that the statutory terms are "interchangeable and synonymous." [d. at 
10,511. 
72. Department of Justice Advisory Opinion rendered for the Department of Commerce and 
the Department of the Interior 13-14 (April 20, 1979) [hereinafter citpri as DOJ Opinion]. See 
10 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 1 (April 25, 1979). 
73. DOJ Opinion, supra note 72, at 13-14. 
74. [d. at 14. 
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regulations, amended in June, 1979, reflect the Justice Department 
opinion.75 Thus, the "directly affecting" threshold test of section 
307(c)(1) is at present undefined by the regulations. 76 However, 
NOAA favors a liberal application of the "directly affecting" test: 
"given the benefits to be derived from this [consistency] process, 
federal agencies are encouraged to construe liberally the 'directly af-
fecting' test in borderline cases to favor inclusion of Federal ac-
tivities subject to consistency review."77 
NOAA's present regulations specify that federal activities related 
to the OCS leasing process which take place before a lease sale are 
subject to consistency review under section 307(c)(1) ifthey have the 
requisite "direct effect" on the coastal zone.78 The Department of 
the Interior's application of the "directly affecting" test to its pre-
lease sale activities has generated considerable controversy. Interior 
concluded that its activities prior to Lease Sale No. 48 had no "direct 
effect" on the California coastal zone, and the California Coastal 
Commission sharply disagreed. The facts of this dispute as well as 
the legal and policy arguments of the parties will be discussed in 
detail in the following section. This controversy illustrates the prob-
lem of applying section 307(c)(1)'s threshold test, resulting from the 
ambiguity of the language of the statute and the absence of helpful 
interpretative guidelines in the regulations. 
III. THE PROBLEM WITH THE ApPLICATION OF THE 
"DIRECTLY AFFECTING" TEST TO OCS PRE-LEASE ACTIVITIES 
A_, oes Pre-lease Sale Procedures 
The OCSLA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to lease OCS 
tracts for mineral development. 79 Within the Department of the In-
75. 15 C.F.R. § 930.33 (1979); 44 Fed. Reg. 37,141-42 (1979) (supplementary information). 
As this article goes to print, NOAA has issued proposed regulations for section 307(c)(1) which 
provide a detailed definition for the term "directly affecting." This most recent interpretation 
provides that a "direct effect" means "a measurable physical alteration in the coastal zone 
produced by the conduct of the federal activity itself or by a chain of events, initiated by the 
federal activity, which is reasonably certain to result in such alterations without further re-
quired agency approval." 46 Fed. Reg. 26,658, 26,660 (1981). In addition, the regulations pro-
vide a series of examples of the types of federal activities which would cause a "direct effect" 
on the coastal zone. [d. at 26,660. 
76. 15 C.F.R. § 930.33 (1979). 
77. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,146-47 (1979) (comment to 15 C.F.R. S 930.33 (1979». 
78. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,154 (1979) (comment to 15 C.F.R. § 930.31(a) (1979». But see note 156 
infra. 
79. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (Supp. III 1979). The federal government has sole jurisdiction over 
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terior the Director of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) ad-
ministers the OCS leasing process under the direction of the Secre-
tary.80 The OCSLA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to grant 
oil and gas leases for tracts on the OCS not exceeding 5,760 acres 
(three miles by three miles).81 A lease entitles the lessee to explore, 
develop, and produce the oil and gas contained within the lease area. 
A lease is valid for a period of five to ten years and will be extended 
the OCS and all leasing activities conducted thereon. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(1) (Supp. III 1979). 
Prior to 1947, however, it was presumed that each state owned the submerged lands adjacent 
to its respective coastline. [1953] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1385, 1417; Note, States' 
Rights in the Outer Continental Shelf Denied by the United States Supreme Court, 30 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 203-04 (1975). This presumption was based on Supreme Court rulings that the title to 
submerged lands passed at the time of the American Revolution from the English Crown to 
the states as sovereigns rather than to the United States. See, e.g., Martin V. Waddell, 41 U.S. 
367 (1842). However, in response to the gradual recognition of the potentially valuable mineral 
resources of the OCS, President Harry S. Truman issued a proclamation on September 28, 
1945 statingthatthe United States regarded the "natural resources of the subsoil and seabed 
of the continental shelfbeneath the-high seas contiguous to the coasts of the United States as 
subject to its jurisdiction and control." Pres. Proc. No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-48 Compila-
tion), reprinted in 59 Stat. 884 (1945). 
In United States V. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), the Supreme Court rejected the prior rul-
ings in this area, and held that the federal government controlled the entire OCS on the basis 
of national defense and international relations considerations. The California holding and ra-
tionale was subsequently applied in two similar cases: United States V. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 
(1950) and United States V. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950). Congress modified the scope of this 
decision with the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-31, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) (codified 
at 43 U.S.C. S§ 1301-1315 (1976» and the OCSLA. The Submerged Lands Act released and re-
linquished to the states jurisdiction of the submerged lands extending to the three mile limit of 
the territorial1!ea. 43 U.S.C. S 1311(b)(1) (1976). Historic boundaries of three marine leagues 
(approximately nine miles) were retained for the states bordering on the Gulf of Mexico. 43 
U.S.C. § 1301(b) (1976). The OCSLA gave the federal government jurisdiction over the seabed 
of the continental shelf which extends outward from the three mile limit. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(1) 
(1976). See note 4 supra. 
In United States V. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975), the Supreme Court confirmed sole federal 
jurisdiction over the OCS and made it clear that the states had no right to participate in the 
decision-making aspects of resource development beyond the three mile limit nor would they 
share in lease bonuses or royalties. It appears that the Maine decision effectively forecloses 
further state challenges to federal jurisdiction of the OCS. A more detailed discussion of the 
history of the jurisdictional dispute over offshore lands may be found in Note, States' Rights in 
the Outer Continental Shelf Denied by the United States Supreme Court, 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
203 (1975); Breedan, Federalism and the Development of Outer Continental Shelf Mineral 
Resources, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1107 (1976); Jurisdiction over the Seabed: Persistent Federal-
State Conflicts, 12 URBAN L. ANN. 291 (1976). 
80. 43 U.S.C. S 1334(a) (Supp. III 1979); 43 C.F.R. §§ 3300-3340 (1979). See H.R. REP. No. 
590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1450, 
1466. 
81. 43. U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979). However, the tract size limitation need not be 
observed if the Secretary of the Interior determines that a larger tract is "necessary to com-
prise a reasonable economic production unit." [d. 43 C.F.R. S 3314.2 (1979). 
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for as long as the tract continues to produce in paying quantities.82 
The Secretary of the Interior initiates the OCS leasing process by 
preparing a comprehensive five-year leasing program.83 In selecting 
areas for OCS development the Secretary must balance the potential 
for environmental damage and adverse impact on the coastal zone 
with the potential for the discovery of petroleum.84 A proposed pro-
gram is submitted to the governors of affected coastal states and 
their local governments for review and comment.85 Before the 
Secretary can give final approval to the five-year leasing schedule, 
the plan, together with all comments received from the coastal states 
must be submitted to Congress for review.86 The OCSLA requires 
82. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(2) (Supp. III 1979). 
83. Id. S 1344; 43 C.F.R. § 3310.2(a)(1) (1979). 
The program must consist of "a schedule of proposed lease sales indicating, as precisely as 
possible, the size, timing, and location ofleasing activity .... " 43 U.S.C. S 1344(a) (Supp. III 
1979). The OCSLA mandates that consideration be given to a series of factors in the formula-
tion of the five-year leasing plan, many of which address environmental concerns: 
Timing and location of exploration, development, and production of oil and gas among 
the oil- and gas-bearing physiographic regions of the outer Continental Shelf shall be 
based on a consideration of-
(A) existing information concerning the geographical, geological, and ecological char-
acteristics of such regions; 
(B) an equitable sharing of developmental benefits and environmental risks among 
the various regions; 
(C) the location of such regions with respect to, and the relative needs of, regional 
and national energy markets; 
(D) the location of such regions with respect to other uses of the sea and seabed, in-
cluding fisheries, navigation, existing or proposed sea-lanes, potential sites of deep-
water ports, and other anticipated uses of the resources and space of the outer Con-
tinental Shelf; 
(E) the interest of potential oil and gas producers in the development of oil and gas 
resources as indicated by exploration or nomination; 
(F) laws, goals, and policies of affected States which have been specifically identified 
by the Governors of such States as relevant matters for the Secretary's considera-
tion; 
(G) the relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity of different areas 
of the outer Continental Shelf; and 
(H) relevant environmental and predictive information for different areas of the 
outer Continental Shelf. 
43 U.S.C. S 1344(a)(2) (Supp. III 1979). In addition, the Secretary must consider the policies 
and objectives of approved state coastal management programs in making tract selections. Id. 
S 1344(f); 43 C.F.R. S 3310.4 (1979). BLM must prepare an environmental impact statement 
for the leasing program in accordance with NEP A prior to publishing the proposed program. 
84. 43 U.S.C. S 1344(8)(3) (Supp. III 1979). "Management of the program is to be balanced, 
considering all the economic, social and environmental impacts of oil and gas activities. . . ." 
H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 149, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 1450, 1555. 
85. 43 U.S.C. S 1344(c) (2) (Supp. III 1979); 43 C.F.R. S 3310.2(a) (1) (1979). 
86. 43 U.S.C. S 1344(c) (3) (Supp. III 1979); 43 C.F.R. S 3310.2(c) (1979). On June 16, 1980, 
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the Secretary to review the leasing program at least annually and he 
or she may update or reapprove the program without change. 87 
After the Secretary gives final approval to a five-year leasing 
schedule, the United States Geologic Survey, a division of the De-
partment of the Interior, conducts preliminary exploration, and 
prepares surveys and resource reports which analyze the potential 
oil and gas reserves contained in the areas included in the leasing 
schedule.88 The petroleum industry also participates in preliminary 
exploration, and may be required to provide BLM with access to geo-
logical and geophysical data obtained as a result of its exploratory 
activities. 89 In addition, BLM requests resource reports from other 
former Secretary of the Interior, Cecil D. Andrus, approved the 1980-1985 OCS Leasing Pro-
gram, the first five-year program prepared under the OCSLA. See 11 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) (curr. 
dev.) 550 (Aug. 8, 1980). The validity of the program is presently being challenged by two 
coastal states and a number of environmental groups; a petition for review of the Secretary's 
action which alleged numerous violations of the OCSLA was filed last August in the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 1349 
(Supp. III 1979). California v. Andrus, No. 80-1894 (D.C. Cir., fIled Aug. 1, 1980); Alaska v. 
Andrus, No. 80-1897 (D.C. Cir., filed Aug. 4, 1980); Natural Resources Defense Council v. An-
drus, No. 80-1935 (D.C. Cir., filed Aug. 4, 1980); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, No. 80-1991 
(D.C. Cir., filed Aug. 4, 1980). 
Petitioners' challenge to the leasing program rests on the following contentions: (1) the 
Secretary's decisions regarding the timing and location of OCS development do not reflect 
adequate consideration of environmental factors as required by section 18 of the OCSLA. See 
note 89 supra; (2) the Secretary violated section 18(a)(3) of the OCSLA by failing to balance 
potential environmental damage and adverse coastal zone impacts with the potential for the 
discovery of petroleum; (3) the Secretary violated section 19 of the OCSLA by rejecting 
reasonable comments of affected coastal states concerning the size, timing, and location of 
future lease sales; (4) the Secretary violated section 4(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 
5 U.S.C. S 553(c) (1976), by failing to articulate the reasons for his decisions on the timing and 
location of OCS development; (5) the environmental impact statement prepared by the Depart-
ment of the Interior with respect to the five-year leasing program violated the requirements of 
NEP A because it was not drafted until after the proposed program was published, and it failed 
to adequately assess the potential environmental hazards of the scheduled lease sales; and (6) 
the Secretary's designation of Lease Sales No. 73 and No. 80 simply as "California" violated 
the OCSLA requirement that the location of OCS lease sale areas be designated "as precisely 
as possible." Petitioners' Brief at 1-2, California v. Andrus, No. 80-1894 (D.C. Cir., filed 
August 1, 1980). 
The case is presently pending and will receive expedited review in accordance with the re-
quirements of the OCSLA. 43 U.S.C. SS 1349(c)-1349(d) (Supp. III 1979). The court will utilize 
the "substantial evidence" test to review the decisions made by the Secretary of the Interior. 
See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). Thus, the 
Secretary's findings if supported by substantial evidence on the record before him will be con-
clusive. 43 U.S.C. S 1349(c)(6) (Supp. III 1979). In view of the deferential standard of review to 
be applied and the discretionary type of decisions at issue, it seems likely that the court will be 
unwilling to require modification of the five-year program. 
87. 43 U.S.C. S 1344(e) (Supp. III 1979). 
88. 43 C.F.R. S 3312 (1979). 
89. 30 C.F.R. S 252.3 (1980); STAFF OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 93d Cong., 2d 
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interested federal agencies which describe known valuable resources 
or environmental concerns within the OCS area being considered for 
lease.9o 
Following the preliminary exploration phase, BLM conducts a 
series of administrative proceedings which culminate in a lease sale 
pursuant to which individual tracts are auctioned by competitive bid 
to members of the petroleum industry. Under the OCSLA, Interior's 
pre-lease activities include the following steps: (1) Call for Nomina-
tions and Comments; (2) tentative tract selection; (3) preparation of 
environmental assessment studies and environmental impact state-
ments in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act;91 
(4) consultation with governors of affected states; and (5) issuance of 
the Final Notice of Sale.92 
The Call for Nominations and Comments provides the petroleum 
industry with an opportunity to indicate specific tracts which it is 
interested in developing. 93 At the same time, any interested parties94 
may make "negative determinations" which are formal indications 
of the tracts which they wish deleted from the lease sale.95 BLM 
utilizes the information submitted to make preliminary tract selec-
tions from the area subject to the Call. 96 BLM then subjects the 
selected tracts to intensive environmental study and analysis. In ac-
cordance with the requirements of the National Environmental 
Policy Act and the guidelines promulgated thereunder,97 BLM pre-
pares an environmental impact statement, which analyzes the envi-
Sess., OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASING OFF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: 
ANALYSIS OF ISSUES 17 (Comm. Print 1974); Note, Coastal Zone Impacts of Offshore Oil and 
Gas Development: An Accommodation Through the California Coastal Act of 1976,8 PAC. L. J. 
783, 788 (1977). For purposes of this article the term "petroleum industry" will be used to 
refer to both the oil and gas industries. 
90. Prior to Lease Sale No. 48, BLM requested resource reports from the Environmental 
Protection Agency, Bureau of Mines, Department of Defense, NOAA, Bureau of Fish and 
Wildlife, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Federal Power Commis-
sion. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMIT· 
TEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, SOME ISSUES AFFECTING SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA OUTER 
CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL AND GAS LEASE SALE No. 48, 21-22 (May 5,1980) [hereinafter cited as 
GAO REPORT). 
91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4347 (1976). 
92. 1980 Oversight Hearings, supra note 56, at 322. 
93. 43 C.F.R. § 3313 (1979). 
94. Typically BLM receives negative nominations from federal agencies, state and local 
coastal management agencies, environmental concern groups, and private citizens. See, e.g., 
GAO REPORT, supra note 90, at 8. 
95. 43 C.F.R. § 3313 (1979). See GAO REPORT, supra note 90, at 8. 
96. 43 C.F.R. § 3314.1(a) (1979). 
97. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (1978). 
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ronmental risks associated with the proposed lease sale and presents 
reasonable alternative courses of action. During the preparation of 
this document BLM conducts an extensive hearings and commenting 
process through which interested federal and state agencies as well 
as members of the public may submit relevant information.98 The 
Secretary of the Interior then utilizes the environmental impact 
statement to select tracts for inclusion in the proposed Notice of 
Sale.99 
The proposed Notice of Sale tentatively sets forth the size, num-
ber, and location of the tracts to be offered for sale, as well as stipu-
lations and conditions to be included in the individual leases. 100 Pur-
suant to section 19 of the OCSLA, the governors of affected states 
have sixty days in which to submit comments on the proposed Notice 
of Sale and recommendations as to the size, location, and timing of 
the lease sale, as well as the adequacy of the proposed lease stipula-
tions and conditions. 101 The OCSLA mandates that the Secretary of 
the Interior must accept the recommendations of a state governor if 
the Secretary determines that they "provide for a reasonable bal-
ance between the national interest and the well-being of the citizens 
of the affected State."102 If the Secretary does not accept a state rec-
ommendation, he or she must issue a letter of explanation. 103 
In the last pre-lease activity, BLM publishes the Final Notice of 
Sale in the Federal Register. 104 The Final Notice of Sale conclusively 
establishes the size and location of the tracts to be offered, the 
98. 40 C.F.R. SS 1501.7, 1503, 1506.6 (1978). For example, prior to Lease Sale No. 53, see 
text at notes 157-67 infra, BLM held six scoping meetings in central and northern California 
in accordance with the requirement that there be "an early and open process for determining 
the scope of issues to be addressed and for identifying the significant issues related to [the] 
proposed actions." 40 C.F.R. S 1501.7 (1978). See FEIS, supra note 5, at 1-4. The meetings 
were open to all interested parties. In addition, after the draft environmental impact state-
ment was prepared, it was made available for public review, and BLM conducted eight days of 
public hearings on the content of the draft statement in affected California cities. [d. at 1-7. 
99. BLM prepares a Secretarial Issue Document which incorporates the information con· 
tained in the environmental impact statement and describes the Secretary's various lease sale 
options. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 90, at 9. 
100. 43 C.F.R. S 3315 (1979). Lease stipulations and conditions apply either to specific 
leases or to all leases issued pursuant to a lease sale. Lease conditions and stipulations general· 
ly address such concerns as cultural or biological resources, pipeline rights-of·way, disposition 
of drilling wastes and equipment identification. See, e.g., FEIS, supra note 5, at 1-27. 
101. 43 U.S.C. S 1345 (Supp. III 1979); 43 C.F.R. S 3315.2(a) (1979). "The intention of [sec· 
tion 19] is to insure that Governors of affected states have a leading role in decisions as to 
potential lease sales . . . ." S. REP. No. 284, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 78 (1977). 
102. 43 U.S.C. S 1345(c) (Supp. III 1979); 43 C.F.R. S 3315.2(b) (1979). 
103. 43 U.S.C. S 1345(c) (Supp. III 1979); 43 C.F.R. S 3315.2(c) (1979). 
104. 43 C.F.R. S 3315.4(a) (1979). 
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timing of the lease sale, and the conditions and stipulations to be in-
cluded in the leases. 105 The Department of the Interior conducts the 
actual sale of leases by sealed competitive bid, and awards tracts to 
the highest responsible and qualified bidders.106 After the lease sale 
the United States Geologic Survey assumes administrative authority 
over OCS leasing operations, and oversees the exploration and 
development conducted by the lessees. 107 
B. Current Procedures for State Review of OCS Lease Sales 
Under the OCSLA and the CZMA 
The OCSLA and the CZMA provide two methods by which a 
coastal state may review and comment upon a proposed lease sale. 
The procedures for OCSLA review, discussed in the immediately 
preceding section, occur at several pre-lease stages. 
There are two stages at which the federal consistency provisions of 
the CZMA apply to OCS leasing operations. First, the Department of 
the Interior's activities which precede the lease sale are subject to 
the requirements of section 307(c)(1).108 Therefore, if Interior deter-
mines that any of its pre-lease activities "directly affect" a state 
coastal zone, it must submit a consistency determination to the state 
agency which administers the coastal management program.109 The 
agency has forty-five days in which to review the determination and 
indicate its concurrence or disagreement.1lO 
A second consistency review takes place after the lease sale. Sec-
tion 307(c)(3)(B) of the CZMA applies solely to OCS-related activ-
ities, and ensures the consistency of the post-lease sale operations of 
105. [d. 
106. 43 U.S.C. S 1337(a)(1) (1978); 43 C.F.R. § 3315.4 (1979). Mineral leases may only be 
held by (1) citizens and nationals of the United States; (2) aliens lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence in the United States in accordance with 8 U.S.C. S 1l01(a)(20) (1976); private, 
public, or municipal corporations organized under federal or state law; or (4) associations of 
citizens, nationals, resident aliens, or private, public or municipal corporations, states or 
poli~ical subdivisions of states. 43 C.F.R. S 3316.1(b) (1979). For a discussion of OCS bidding 
procedures, see Jones, Mead, & Sorenson, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amend-
ments of 1978, 19 NAT. RES. J. 885 (1979). 
107. See 30 C.F.R. Parts 200-90 (1980); H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 59, 
reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1466. Post-lease sale procedures will not be 
discussed in this article since its focus is on Interior's pre-lease sale OCS activities. For a 
discussion of post-lease sale operations, see Kreuger & Singer, AnA nalysis of the Outer Con-
tinental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, 19 NAT .. RES. J. 909 (1979). 
108. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,154 (1979) (comment to 15 C.F.R. S 930.71 (1979»; DOJ Opinion, 
supra note 72, at 12-13. 
109. 15 C.F.R. § 930.34(a) (1979). 
110. [d. S 930.41(a). See text at notes 43-48 supra. 
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OCS lessees which will affect any land use or water use in the coastal 
zone.1ll Therefore, when an OCS lessee submits a plan for explora-
tion and development to the Department of the Interior, it must in-
clude a certification, together with supporting documentation, that 
each activity described in the plan complies with the state coastal 
management program and will be conducted in a manner consistent 
with that program. No federal license or permit activity which is 
described in detail in the exploration and development plan may be 
issued unless the state concurs with the applicant's consistency 
determination. 112 
The state's power to pass upon consistency under section 307(c)(3) 
(B) is not, however, unfettered. The Department of Commerce may 
override a state's objection to an OCS lessee's certification of con-
sistency on two grounds. First, Commerce may determine that the 
disputed federal license or permit activity is consistent with the 
objectives or purposes of the CZMA.1l3 Alternatively, Commerce 
may conclude that the federal license or permit activity, although in-
consistent with the state program, is necessary in the interest of na-
tional security.1l4 The Department of Commerce has not yet invoked 
its override power in connection with the OCS leasing process.1l5 
Thus far, state review of OCS leasing activities under the federal 
consistency provisions of the CZMA has been limited to review of 
post-lease sale activities under section 307(c)(3)(B). States have been 
unable to review pre-lease activities under section 307(c)(1) because 
the Department of the Interior has taken the position that its pre-
lease activities "directly affect" a state's coastal zone only in very 
limited circumstances.1l6 Thus, although it is potentially applicable 
111. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B) (1976). The CZMA was extensively amended in 1976 primari-
ly in response to the increase in energy related development in coastal areas and the OCS as a 
result of the energy crisis. "[I]t was not until the Arab oil embargo occurred, exactly a year 
after passage of the Coastal Zone Management Act, that State governments realized the in-
tensity of these developmental pressures on the coastal zone." S. REP. No. 277, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 9 (1975), reprinted in CZMA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 1, at 735. Section 
307(cX3(B) was added to "strengthen the States' ability to cope with OCS impacts .... " [d. 
at 745. For a discussion of the 1976 CZMA amendments, see Note, The Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act Amendments of1976, 1 HARV. ENVT'LL. REV. 259 (1976). 
112. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B) (1976). "In practical terms, this [Section 307(c)(3)(B)] means 
that the Secretary of the Interior would need to seek the certification of consistency from adja-
cent State governors before entering into a binding lease agreement with private oil com-
panies." S. REP. No. 277, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1975), reprinted in CZMA LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 746. 
113. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B)(iii) (1976); 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.121, 930.130(a) (1979). 
114. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B)(iii) (1976); 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.122, 930.130(a) (1979). 
115. See note 117 infra. 
116. Memorandum of the Office of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior on the 
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to pre-lease activities, section 307(c)(1) has been ineffective so far as 
a means of involving the states in Interior's decisionmaking prior to 
a lease sale. 
With respect to post-lease sale activities, section 307(c)(3)(B) af-
fords the states considerable leverage. The state, rather than the 
Department of the Interior has the right to pass on the consistency 
of a lessee's proposed development plan. The state can, therefore, 
object to exploration and development of a tract which was included 
in the lease sale despite a state recommendation under section 19 of 
the OCSLA that it be deleted, and with regard to which the state 
could not object under section 307(c)(1) because Interior had issued a 
negative determination.117 But a state's attempt to halt OCS devel-
opment by making an arbitrary or capricious finding of inconsistency 
would most likely fail; the objection must be premised on a violation 
of a provision of the state coastal plan. Otherwise, the state decision 
would probably be overridden by the Department of Commerce. It 
also seems unlikely that a state could successfully base a consistency 
objection under section 307(c)(3)(B) on a minor or technical incon-
sistency with a state coastal management program. In such a situa-
tion, the Department of Commerce might well exercise its override 
power, concluding that although the activity would be inconsistent 
with the state program, it nevertheless comported with the policies 
and objectives of the CZMA.llS 
Consistency of Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Prelease Activities with Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Programs 11 (Oct. 10, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Solicitor's Opinion]. 
Interior historically maintained that the states had no right to participate in the OCS leasing 
process at the pre-lease stage. However, the Department of Justice rejected the Interior posi-
tion and concluded that pre-lease activities are not per se exempt from the requirements of 
section 307(c)(I). See text at notes 131-34 infra. 
117. On August 25, 1980 the California Coastal Commission (CCC) objected to a certifica-
tion of consistency made by Chevron USA, Inc., in connection with its application for an off-
shore oil drilling permit. Wall Street Journal, Aug. 22, 1980, at 10, col. 1. This was the first 
time a state has exercised its consistency powers under section 307(c)(3)(B). California's find-
ing of inconsistency related to a proposed exploratory oil well on OCS Parcel 0205 in the Santa 
Barbara Channel. The proposed site was 5.7 nautical miles north of Anacapa Island, a 
breeding place of the brown pelican, an endangered species. California Coastal Commission, 
Staff Recommendation on Consistency Certification No. CC-7-80 (Chevron USA) 6 (Aug. 19, 
1980). The California coastal management program provides that OCS activities cannot be 
conducted with six miles of such areas; the proposed site therefore violated this rule. Further-
more, the CCC concluded that the proposed activity would violate several other provisions of 
the California coastal program including the prohibition on "significant disruption" of "en-
vironmentally sensitive habitat areas" and a requirement of "special protection for areas and 
species of special biological or economic significance." [d. at 14-15; CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 
30230,30240 (West 1977). Surprisingly, Chevron did not appeal to the Department of Com-
merce for an override of California's consistency objection. 
118. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(B)(iii) (1976); 15 C.F.R. §§ 930.121, 930.130(a) (1979). See text 
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In the present procedures provided for state participation in the 
OCS leasing process under the CZMA and the OCSLA, the states are 
limited to advisory roles. The OCSLA amendments increase the level 
of state participation and provide many opportunities for the states 
to review and comment upon proposed lease sales. However, deci-
sion-making authority rests with the Department of the Interior. 
Similarly, under the CZMA, Interior makes the decisions as to con-
sistency prior to a lease sale.119 The OCSLA and CZMA (as inter-
preted by NOAA)120 probably cast the federal agencies and states in 
the roles which Congress intended with respect to OCS develop-
ment.121 While the respective roles may be properly assigned, the ap-
plication of the state review procedure provided in section 307(c)(1) 
of the CZMA to OCS pre-lease sale activities is at the heart of the 
controversy between the Department of the Interior and the Califor-
nia Coastal Commission. 
C. The Dispute Between California and the 
Department of the Interior 
1. The Background Facts and Mediation Proceeding: 
Lease Sale No. 48 
The pre-lease consistency controversy initially arose in connection 
with Lease Sale No. 48 which was held in Los Angeles on June 29, 
1979. The Department of the Interior offered for sale 148 OCS tracts 
off southern California. The bids on 54 tracts were accepted, 47 of 
which were in the Santa Barbara Channel.122 
The dispute between the Department of the Interior and the 
California Coastal Commission (CCG) in Lease Sale No. 48 turned on 
the question of whether the pre-lease activities conducted by Interior 
"directly affected" the California coastal zone, thereby triggering 
the requirement of section 307(c)(1) of the CZMA that they be 
consistent with the California Coastal Zone Management 
at notes 113-14 supra_ The CZMA does require consideration of the need for economic 
development in its statement of policy_ 16 U.S-C. § 1452 (1976) (amended 1980). 
119. See text at notes 41-48 supra. 
120. See text at notes 56-78 supra. 
121. Congress has stated that no "State should have veto power over OCS oil and gas ac-
tivities." H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 153 (1977); S. REP. No. 284, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 78 (1977). See also Schoenbaum & Parker, Federalism in the Coastal Zone: Three Models 
o/State Jurisdiction and Control, 57 N.C. L. REV. 231, 235 (1978). 
122. GAO REPORT, supra note 90, at 11. 
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Program. 123 California took the position that the Final Notice of Sale 
"directly affected" the coastal zone within the meaning of section 
307(c)(1),124 while Interior maintained that its OCS activities con-
ducted prior to Lease Sale No. 48 did not have any "direct effect."125 
On December 5, 1978, the CCC wrote to the President of the 
United States and requested assistance in resolving the California-
Interior disagreement. 126 The Department of Commerce subse-
quently assumed responsibility for the matter due to its administra-
tive authorization under the CZMA.127 On March 23, 1979, Com-
merce and Interior made a joint request to the Department of Justice 
123. The California Coastal Act of 1976, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West 1977 & 
Supp. 1980) established California's present coastal zone management program. Id. § 30008. 
The 1976 Act was the successor to the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act, CAL. PUB. 
RES. CODE §§ 27000-27650 (West 1977) (repealed 1977) which was passed by citizens' initiative 
Proposition 20 in 1972, and expired at the end of 1976. The California Coastal Management 
Program was approved by the Department of Commerce in 1978. 1980 Oversight Hearings, 
supra note 56, at 11. 
The California Coastal Act is patterned on the CZMA, and is thus far the most comprehen-
sive state coastal protective legislation enacted. It establishes a two-tiered system in its 
coastal plan. The Act sets forth policies and framework for land use planning in the California 
coastal zone. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30200-30264 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980). The California 
Coastal Commission oversees the implementation of the policies and objectives of the Act at 
the state level. However, the decision-making aspects of coastal area protection are largely the 
responsibility of the local governments. The Act requires each local government along the 
California coast to prepare and administer a local coastal program which incorporates its 
policies. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30500 (West Supp. 1980). The Coastal Commission must ap-
prove each local coastal program before it becomes operative. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 
30510-30522 (West 1977 & Supp. 1980). After it has been certified, the sole authority for is-
suance of coastal development permits reverts back to the local governments, as long as 
decision making conforms with the standards set forth in the local program. CAL. PuB. RES. 
CODE § 30600 (West 1977). For detailed discussions of the history of California coastal 
management legislation see Coastal Futures: Legal Issues Affecting the Development of the 
California Coast, 2 STAN. ENVT'L L. ANN. (1979); Finnell, Coastal Land Management in 
California, A.B.A. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 647, 649 (1978); Note, Coastal Zone Impacts of 
Offshore Oil and Gas Development: An Accommodation Through the California Coastal Act of 
1976, 8 PAC. L. J. 783, 799 (1977). 
124. California Coastal Commission, Position of the California Coastal Commission that the 
Notice of Sale for Lease Sale No. 48 Directly Mfects the California Coastal Zone (Paper 
presented at the Department of Commerce Mediation Hearing-Sept. 7, 1979) 3, reprinted in 
1980 Oversight Hearings, supra note 56, at 303 [hereinafter cited as California Position 
Paper]. However, the CCC did agree that the terms of the Lease Sale No. 48 were in fact con-
sistent with the California coastal program. See text at notes 141-43 infra. 
125. 10 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 5 (May 30, 1979) (statement of Heather L. Ross, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior). 
126. Letter from Michael L. Fischer, Executive Director of the California Coastal Commis-
sion, to Jimmy Carter, President of the United States (Dec. 5, 1978). The CZMA provides that 
the Executive Branch will provide assistance in the attempt to resolve controversies arising 
under the Act. 16 U.S.C. S 1456(h) (1976). 
127. 16 U.S.C. S 1463 (1976). 
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that it issue a legal opinion addressing the merits of the Lease Sale 
No. 48 dispute.128 The Department of Justice responded on April 20, 
1979.129 The opinion concluded that Interior's pre-lease activities 
which "directly affect" a state coastal zone are subject to the section 
307(c)(1) consistency requirement. However, the Department of 
Justice refused to decide whether the pre-lease activities conducted 
by Interior prior to Lease Sale No. 48 "directly affected" the coastal 
zone. Justice concluded that the issue was one of fact which it was 
not authorized to consider.130 
Although the Department of Justice did not address the merits of 
the Lease Sale No. 48 dispute, the opinion clearly represented a ma-
jor victory for supporters of California's position and federal con-
sistency generally. The Justice Department opinion expressly re-
jected Interior's long-standing contention that its pre-lease activities 
were per se exempt from the consistency requirement of section 
307(c)(1). Interior had argued to Justice that the CZMA and the 
OCSLA implicitly limited state review under the CZMA to the post-
lease sale exploration and development stage, thereby exempting 
federal activities conducted prior to a lease sale from the consistency 
requirement of section 307(c)(1). The essence of Interior's position 
was that with respect to OCS activities, section 307(c)(3)(B), which 
explicitly requires post-lease sale consistency, superseded section 
307(c)(1).131 The Department of Justice disposed of this argument by 
128. Letter from William V. Skidmore, Acting General Counsel of the Department of Com· 
merce and Frederick N. Ferguson, Deputy Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, to John 
M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice (March 23, 1979). 
129. DOJ Opinion, supra note 72. 
130. [d. at 12·14. 
131. Letter from William V. Skidmore, Acting General Counsel of the Department of Com-
merce and Frederick N. Ferguson, Deputy Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, to John 
M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice (March 23, 1979). 
Section 307(c)(3)(B) was enacted in 1976. See note 111 supra. Initially, however, Congress 
considered adding the word "lease" to the original section 307(c)(3). This amendment would 
have required OCS leases to be consistent with state coastal management programs. While the 
Senate passed a bill which included this amendment, it was deleted from the House bill. Sec-
tion 307(c)(3)(B) which applies to OCS exploration and development plans rather than OCS 
leases, was ultimately adopted in lieu of the amendment to section 307(c) (3). See Deller, 
Federalism and Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing; Must Federal Tract Selection and Lease 
Stipulations Be Consistent with State Coastal Zone Management Programs? 14 V.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 105, 114-15 (1980). 
The Department of the Interior relied upon this legislative history to argue that with respect 
to OCS activities, section 307(c)(3)(B) implicitly repealed the other federal consistency provi-
sions. Department of the Interior, Application ofthe Federal Consistency Requirements of the 
Coastal Zone Management Act to the Department of the Interior's Outer Continental Shelf Oil 
and Gas Leasing Program: The Position of the Department of the Interior 15 (March, 1979). 
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concluding that the doctrine of repeal by implication was not ap-
plicable to the CZMA consistency provisions. Justice relied upon two 
Supreme Court pronouncements that repeals by implication are not 
favored. 132 The Supreme Court had held that there must be clear 
evidence of Congress' intent to repeal the statutory provision in 
question in order to apply the doctrine; there must be a "positive 
repugnancy" between the statutes which cannot be reconciled.133 
Since nothing expressly or impliedly indicated that section 307(c) 
(3)(B) of the CZMA was intended to be the only consistency provi-
sion applicable to OCS activities, Justice concluded that the requisite 
"positive repugnancy" between the two provisions did not exist. 134 
The Department of Justice also rejected Interior's second conten-
tion that the OCSLA in effect superseded section 307(c)(1) as to OCS 
activities. Justice did acknowledge possible merit in the argument 
that section 19 of the OCSLA which requires pre-lease sale coordina-
tion between Interior and the governor of an affected state could by 
its specificity take precedence over section 307(c)(1).135 However, 
since the OCSLA and its legislative history expressly provided that 
the Act was not intended to modify any aspect of the CZMA, In-
terior's contention could not prevaiJ.136 
The Department of the Interior indicated that it would abide by the 
Justice Department opinion,137 but it soon became apparent that 
California was little closer to subjecting the Final Notice of Sale in 
Lease Sale No. 48 to a section 307(c)(1) consistency determination. 
By letter dated May 25, 1979, Interior informed the CCC that its pre-
lease activities leading to Lease Sale No. 48 did not "significantly af-
fect"138 the California coastal zone and, therefore, no consistency 
132. DOJ Opinion, supra note 72, at 10. The cases relied upon were Morton v. Mancari, 417 
U.S. 535, 549-51 (1974) and United States v. Borden, 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939) (quoting Wood 
v. United States, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 336 (1842». 
133. DOJ Opinion, supra note 72, at 10. 
134. fd. at 10-11. 
135. fd. at 11-12. 
136. fd. at 12. Section 608 of the OCSLA amendments provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise 
expressly provided in this Act, nothing in this Act shall be construed to amend, modify, or 
repeal any provision of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972. . . ." Pub. L. No. 95-372, 
92 Stat. 632 (1978). See also H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 153, n.52 (1977), re-
printed in [1978] U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NEWS 1450, 1559: "Specifically, nothing is intended 
to alter procedures under that Act for consistency once a State has an approved Coastal Zone 
Management Plan." 
137. 10 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 1 (May 9, 1979) (statement of Heather L. Ross, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Interior). 
138. Although the Justice Department Opinion rejected the uniform "significantly affect-
ing" standard to define "direct effects" under section 307(c)(1), NOAA had not amended the 
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determination would be made. la9 Not surprisingly, this negative 
determination prompted an outraged response from the CCC, and 
was termed "an ill-advised attempt to circumvent the Department of 
Justice legal memorandum."14o 
Even though the CCC did not receive a consistency determination 
prior to the issuance of the Final Notice of Sale for Lease Sale No. 
48, California conceded that the substantive aspects of Lease Sale 
No. 48 were generally consistent with its coastal management plan, 
due to Interior's responsiveness to the environmental study and 
review and comment procedures of the OCSLA.141 Of the initial 
2,400 OCS tracts subject to the Call for Nominations, Interior in-
cluded only 148 tracts in the Final Notice of Sale.142 California felt 
regulations to reflect Justice's conclusion at the time Interior issued the negative determina-
tion on Lease Sale No. 48. See text at notes 70-76 supra. 
139 . [d. Letterfrom Heather L. Ross, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Department of the 
Interior, to Michael L. Fischer, Executive Director of the California Coastal Commission (May 
25, 1979); 10 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 5 (May 30, 1979). 
140. 10 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 6 (July 11, 1979) (statement of Michael L. Fischer, 
Executive Director of the California Coastal Commission). 
141. California Position Paper, supra note 124, at 1. 
142. GAO REPORT, supra note 90, at 6,11. On July 16, 1976, BLM made its Call for Nomina-
tions and Comments for proposed Lease Sale No. 48. 41 Fed. Reg. 29,440 (1976). The Call area 
comprised 2,400 tracts which included the entire southern California OCS from Point Concep-
tion to the Mexican border. GAO REPORT, supra note 90, at 6. In response to the Call, 
petroleum companies nominated 970 tracts for inclusion in the sale. Almost 200 negative 
nominations were received. [d. at 6-8. On January 18, 1977, Interior announced its tentative 
selection of 217 tracts for inclusion in Lease Sale No. 48. [d. at 9. The environmental assess-
ment study and EIS were prepared, therefore, for those 217 tracts. In response to the final 
EIS, Interior deleted 69 additional tracts from the proposed Notice of Sale, which it issued on 
March 3, 1979. The reasons for the deletion of the 69 tracts included: (1) the protection of 
valuable seabird and marine mammal habitats in the Santa Barbara Islands; (2) defense con-
siderations; (3) prevention of hazards to navigation; (4) consideration of commercial and sport 
fishing; and (5) geologic hazards to petroleum development present in certain tracts. [d. at 11. 
Pursuant to section 19 of the OCSLA, the Governor of California, Edmund G. Brown, Jr., 
submitted comments and recommendations on the proposed Notice of Sale by letter dated May 
10, 1979. Letter from Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of California, to Cecil D. Andrus, 
Secretary of the Interior (May 10, 1979). The letter voiced strong support for the proposed 
Notice of Sale and commended Interior's efforts to balance environmental and navigational 
safety standards with OCS development. With respect to tract selection, the Governor's letter 
requested only two alterations: (1) the deletion of tract No. 116, north of Santa Barbara Island 
to protect valuable seabird and marine mammal rookeries; and (2) the deletion of the lower 
third of tract No. 075 on the Ventura Flats in the eastern end of the Santa Barbara Channel. 
California wanted to preserve its option to consider that area as a siting for a future offshore 
liquified natural gas terminal. In addition, the letter requested alterations to a number of lease 
stipulations and conditions. [d. 
Interior issued the Final Notice of Sale for Lease Sale No. 48 on May 29, 1979, which 
responded favorably to most of California's alteration requests. 44 Fed. Reg. 30,770 (1979). 
Interior included both tract No. 075 and tract No. 116 in the lease sale. [d. at 30,773. However, 
Interior added additional stipulations to the Notice of Sale which addressed California's con-
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that only 2 of the 148 tracts should be deleted from the lease sale. In-
terior did not delete the 2 tracts but did add stipulations to the Final 
Notice of Sale which addressed California's concerns with respect to 
those tracts.143 
The CCC's general approval of the substantive aspects of Lease 
Sale No. 48 did not diminish its conviction that a Final Notice of Sale 
should be subject to consistency review under section 307(c)(1).144 
Because of the certainty that future lease sales would be held in Cali-
fornia, the CCC felt that Lease Sale No. 48 should be used to estab-
lish a precedent.145 On June 23, 1979, a week before the lease sale, 
the CCC wrote to the Secretary of Commerce, and requested media-
tion of the "serious disagreement" between California and In-
terior. U6 On July 3, 1979, the Secretary of the Interior, Cecil D. An-
drus, agreed to participate in the mediation process. 147 
cerns about the two tracts. With respect to tract No. 075, stipulation No. 12 provided that no 
activity or permanent construction would be authorized on the southern one-third of the tract, 
unless the lessee demonstrated to Interior's satisfaction that it would not interfere with a 
liquified natural gas terminal. With respect to tract No. 116, stipulation No. 15 stated that 
OCS exploration and development activities would not be permitted within six miles of the 
California coastline. [d. at 30,777. 
Interior did not honor California's request for inclusion in the lease sale of a condition that 
no surface structures be placed in or within 500 meters of vessel shipping lanes, and a stipula-
tion that emissions related to OCS activities be reviewed by local air pollution agencies. Letter 
from Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor of the State of California, to Cecil D. Andrus, 
Secretary of the Interior (May 10, 1979). It appears that Interior's failure to include the latter 
stipulation was appropriate in view of California v. Kleppe, 604 F.2d 1187 (9th Cir. 1979). In 
Kleppe the court addressed the problem of regulatory control of the air quality of OCS opera-
tions, and the conflicting grants of jurisdiction over air quality suits under the OCSLA and the 
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §S 7401-7642 (Supp. III 1979). The court held that the OCSLA 
granted to the Secretary of the Interior the sole authority to regulate OCS air quality, and 
therefore, the Environmental Protection Agency could not subject OCS activities to the re-
quirements of the Clean Air Act. Kleppe was decided after Interior rejected California's re-
quest for an air quality stipulation and is not necessarily dispositive of the consistency issue. 
However, the Kleppe affirmance of Interior's sole authority over OCS air quality does provide 
strong support for Interior's decision on the Lease Sale No. 48 air quality stipulation. For a 
discussion of this case, see California v. Kleppe, 10 ENVT'L L. 685 (1980). 
143. See note 142 supra. 
144. "The fact that the Secretary generally responded to California's recommendations 
does not mean that the activity does not directly affect the coastal zone. It means that the ac-
tivity is consistent with the [California coastal zone management program]." California Posi-
tion Paper, supra note 124, at 8 [emphasis in original]. 
145. California Position Paper, supra note 124, at 1, 8; 10 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 5 
(July 11, 1979). 
146. Section 307(h) of the CZMA provides that "[i]n case of serious disagreement between 
any federal agency and a coastal state. . . the Secretary [of Commerce], with the cooperation 
of the Executive Office of the President, shall seek to mediate the differences involved in such 
disagreement." 16 U.S.C. § 1456(h) (1976). 
147. 10 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 5 (July 11, 1979). Participation in the mediation 
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A public hearing was held in Los Angeles on September 7, 1979, in 
connection with the Lease Sale No. 48 controversy.148 The purpose 
of the hearing was to secure information related to the disagree-
ment, and to provide the public with access to data possessed by the 
Department of the Interior and the CCC which related to the dis-
pute. Much to the surprise and displeasure of many present at the 
hearing, Interior's principals in the Lease Sale No. 48 dispute did not 
attend.149 Instead, a West Coast representative of Interior made a 
statement that any questions raised at the hearing would- be 
answered by Interior, if submitted to its Washington office in 
writing.150 In contrast, the CCC presented a lengthy and comprehen-
sive paper at the hearing, which detailed the policies and legal basis 
in support of its position. In addition, several members of the CCC 
attended the public hearing to respond to questions. 
A mediation conference was held in Washington, D.C. on October 
19, 1979.151 Representatives of Commerce, Interior, the CCC, and 
NOAA attended. Each of the parties restated its position, while In-
terior provided a formal statement of its legal position for the first 
time. The parties considered the feasibility of defining the term 
"directly affecting." After more than five hours, however, the meet-
ing was adjourned without resolution of the controversy.152 
The General Counsel to the Department of Commerce, who pre-
sided at the mediation conference submitted a memorandum to the 
Secretary of Commerce which reported on the proceeding.153 The 
process is entirely voluntary; neither the federal nor state agency can be compelled to mediate 
a disagreement arising under the CZMA. 15 C.F.R. S 930.112(b) (1979). During the course of 
mediation, either party may withdraw at any time. [d. § 930.115(b) (1979). 
148. 10 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 2 (Aug. 15, 1979). Section 307(h) of the CZMA pro-
vides that "[t)he process of such mediation shall, with respect to any disagreement ... in-
clude public hearings which shall be conducted in the local area concerned." 16 U.S.C. § 
1456(h) (1976). 
149. 10 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 3 (Sept. 19, 1979); Transcript of the Lease Sale No. 
48 Mediation Hearing (Sept. 7, 1979) 24-25 (testimony of Michael L. Fischer, Executive Direc-
tor of the California Coastal Commission); id. at 66 (testimony of Helene Linker, attorney for 
the Natural Resources Defense Council). 
150. Transcript of the Lease Sale No. 48 Mediation Hearing (Sept. 7, 1979) 59-60 (testimony 
of Robert Conover, Field Solicitor, Department of the Interior). 
151. 10 COASTAL ZoNE MANAGEMENT J. 1 (Oct. 31, 1979). NOAA's regulations call for a 
mediation conference following the public hearing with representatives from Commerce, the 
disagreeing agencies, and any other parties deemed necessary by the Secretary of Commerce. 
15 C.F.R. S 930.114(a) (1979). 
152. Department of Commerce, Report on the Mediation Conference Between the State of 
California and the U.S. Department of the Interior Conducted by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce (Oct. 19, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Mediation Conference Report). 
153. Memorandum from C.L. Haslam, General Counsel to the Department of Commerce, to 
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memorandum recounted the history of the dispute, and concluded by 
expressing the opinion that the Final Notice of Sale in Lease Sale 
No. 48 was subject to the consistency requirement of section 307(c) 
(1).154 However, in the formal letters sent by the Secretary of Com-
merce to the parties involved in the mediation proceeding, the con-
clusions of the General Counsel were deleted. 155 In light of the unsuc-
cessful mediation of the Lease Sale No. 48 dispute the Secretary of 
Commerce requested NOAA to issue new regulations defining the 
term "directly affecting."156 
2. The Subsequent Controversy: Lease Sale No. 53 
The dispute between the Department of the Interior and the CCC 
unresolved in Lease Sale No. 48 resurfaced in October, 1980, in con-
Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce (Jan. 25, 1980), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1012, 
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1980). 
154. In my opinion, the law comtemplates that pre-lease sale activities as in Cali-
fornia be subject to a consistency determination, and moreover, that this 
would not impose an undue burden in a situation such as this one. The CZM 
program further contemplates that state plans be accorded substantial 
respect where consistency is at issue. DOl has, however, adopted an extreme-
ly narrow and restrictive definition of "directly affect." 
[d. at 84. 
155. See Letter from Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce to Cecil D. Andrus, Secre-
tary of the Interior (Feb. 27, 1980), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1012, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 
79-80 (1980). The CCC reacted angrily to Klutznick's summation of the mediation, which 
Michael L. Fischer, Executive Director of the CCC, said excised "every sentence in the 
slightest way negative toward Interior." See 11 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 2 (March 5, 
1980). Fischer charged that Interior made an "intensive effort" to "quash" the General 
Counsel's memorandum. [d. 
156. See Letter from Philip M. Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce, to Cecil D. Andrus, 
Secretary of the Interior (Feb. 27, 1980), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1012, 96th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 79:80 (1980). After more than a year of delay, NOAA issued proposed regulations for 
section 307(cXl) on May 14, 1981, which provide a detailed definition for "directly affecting." 
46 Fed. Reg. 26,658 (1981). See note 76 supra. The proposed rules adopt a narrow and restric-
tive interpretation of the phrase, and represent a direct departure from NOAA's prior direc-
tive that section 307(cXl)'s threshold test be construed liberally to favor consistency review. 
Specifically excluded from the definition of "directly affecting" are those effects "identified 
by the federal agency as uncertain, speculative, remote or subject to further required agency 
approval." [d. at 26,660. In an accompanying comment, NOAA gives as an example of a 
federal activity which does not directly affect the coastal zone "outer continental shelf oil and 
gas planning and leasing undertaken by the Department of the Interior in the normal course of 
decisionmaking and lease award .... " [d. Thus, the effect of this regulation is to preclude 
consistency review of Interior's tract selections prior to OCS lease sales in all but extraordi-
nary circumstances. This result is in direct contradiction not only of the prior position taken by 
NOAA on this issue, but also of the conclusion reached by the Secretary of Commerce in the 
Lease Sale No. 48 mediation, see note 154 supra and the conclusion of the Department of 
Justice. See text at notes 128-34 supra. 
If NOAA's proposed regulations for section 307(cXl) are finalized, California will challenge 
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nection with Lease Sale No. 53. Interior scheduled this lease sale for 
May, 1981, to auction OCS tracts in waters off Point Conception in 
central California extending to waters off Humboldt Bay in northern 
California. 157 The area included in the Call for Nominations on Lease 
Sale No. 53 comprised five distinct basin areas: Point Arena Basin, 
Bodega Bay Basin, Santa Cruz Basin, Santa Maria Basin, and Eel 
River Basin. 15B 
Prior to the election of Ronald Reagan, the scenario for this lease 
sale paralleled that of Lease Sale No. 48. By letter dated July 8, 
1980,159 the CCC requested that Interior submit a consistency deter-
mination at the time it issued the proposed Notice of Sale on Lease 
Sale No. 53. 160 Interior responded on August 14, 1980, and stated 
that a consistency determination or a negative determination would 
be made at the time the Secretary issued the proposed Notice of 
Sale.161 On October 22, 1980, Interior made a negative determina-
tion on the pre-lease activities associated with proposed Lease Sale 
No. 53 after concluding that none of them had a "direct effect" 
within the meaning of section 307(c)(1).162 But while Interior de-
their validity on the basis that NOAA's reversal of its prior position on the interpretation of 
the provision is an abuse of discretion and therefore violative of section 706 of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2XA) (1976). See 12 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENTJ. 3 (May 
20, 1981). 
157. 11 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 2 (Oct. 22,1980); FEIS, supra note 5, at i. 
158. FEIS, supra note 5, at xii. 
159. Letter from Michael L. Fischer, Executive Director of the California Coastal Commis-
sion, to Cecil D. Andrus, Secretary of the Department of the Interior (July 8, 1980). 
160. NOAA's regulations provide that a consistency determination must be provided to the 
appropriate state agency at least 90 days prior to the "final approval" of the federal activity. 
15 C.F.R. § 930.34(b) (1979). Interior has taken the position that the Final Notice of Sale con-
stitutes "final approval" of an OCS lease sale within the meaning of the regulations. See 
Letter from Heather L. Ross, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Interior, 
to Fram Ulmer, Office of the Governor of Alaska (March 7, 1980). 
Therefore, the proper time to submit a consistency determination or negative determination 
on an OCS lease sale is ninety days prior to the Final Notice of Sale. Ninety days prior to the 
Final Notice coincides with the time for issuance of the proposed Notice of Sale. California's 
position is that it is the Final Notice of Sale which "directly affects" the California coastal 
zone. California Position Paper, supra note 124, at 3. However, because of the ninety day 
waiting period, the consistency determination or negative determination must be made at the 
time of issuance of the proposed Notice of Sale. See Letter from Heather L. Ross, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Interior, to Fran Ulmer, Office of the Governor 
of Alaska (March 7, 1980). 
161. Letter from Cecil D. Andrus, Secretary of the Department of the Interior, to Michael 
L. Fischer, Executive Director of the California Coastal Commission (August 14, 1980). 
162. Letter from Larry E. Meierotto, Assistant Secretary of the Department of the In-
terior, to Michael L. Fischer, Executive Director of the California Coastal Commission (Oct. 
22, 1980). "[W]e have assessed the possible effects of the Department's pre-lease activities 
associated with OCS Lease Sale No. 53 and found that none directly affects the California 
coastal zone." [d. 
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clined to issue a consistency determination to the CCC, former 
Secretary Andrus eliminated virtually a large part of the controver-
sy as to the substantive aspects of Lease Sale No. 53; in response to 
the OCSLA environmental assessment studies, former Secretary 
Andrus deleted all of the tracts in four of the five basin areas from 
the lease sale. 163 The new Secretary of the Interior, James G. Watt, 
initially indicated that he might revise the tract selections for Lease 
Sale No. 53, and include tracts in the four basins previously deleted 
by former Secretary Andrus. However, the Final Notice of Sale, 
issued on April 27, 1981, included only the 115 tracts in the Santa 
Maria Basin.164 
Despite the deletion of the four controversial basin areas from 
Lease Sale No. 53, California did not agree with Interior's decision 
to lease all of the 115 tracts in the Santa Maria basin. In contrast 
with Lease Sale No. 48, the consistency of the terms of Lease Sale 
No. 53 generated considerable dispute, which in turn triggered the 
first litigation as to the applicability of section 307(c)(l) of the CZMA 
to a Final Notice of Sale. The governor of California's request for the 
deletion of the thirty-four northernmost tracts in the Santa Maria 
Basin was rejected by Secretary Watt on April 10, 1981; at the same 
time the Secretary declined to conduct a review of the consistency of 
the terms of the lease sale after concluding that the Final Notice did 
not "directly affect" the coastal zone within the meaning of section 
307(c)(l),165 
163. 11 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 2 (Oct. 22, 1980). In response to BLM's Call for 
Nominations and Comments on November 29, 1977, 42 Fed. Reg. 60,794 (1977), in an area 
comprising 2,036 tracts, the petroleum industry nominated 1,743 tracts. FEIS, supra note 5, 
at 1-4. On October 10, 1978, BLM announced the tentative selection of 243 tracts for en-
vironmental study. Id. However, Secretary Andrus deleted more than half of the 243 tracts 
evaluated in the final EIS from the proposed Notice of Sale. 45 Fed. Reg. 71,139 (1980). 
Secretary Andrus' decision to delete all of the tracts in the four basin areas was made in 
response to concern for the protection of commercial fisheries, seabird rookeries, and 
estuarine and wildlife habitat. 11 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 2 (Oct. 22, 1980). 
164. 46 Fed. Reg. 23,674 (1981). On February 13, 1981, Secretary Watt had issued a new 
proposed Notice of Sale for Lease Sale No. 53 restoring the four basin areas for leasing con-
sideration. 46 Fed. Reg. 12,435, 12,447-53 (1981). It appears that the subsequent decision not 
to lease tracts in the four basins may be short-lived. Secretary Watt announced that he may 
conduct a "second part" of Lease Sale No. 53 before July, 1981, which would include tracts in 
the four basin areas. See 12 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 2 (Apr. 15, 1981). It is expected 
that California would challenge the leasing of any of these tracts in court. See The Wall Street 
Journal, May 27, 1981, at 54, col. 1. 
165. Boston Globe, Apr. 11, 1981, at 3, col. 5. The thirty-four tracts in question stretch from 
Morro Bay to Point Sal. The tracts lie directly seaward of a habitat of the southern sea otter 
and in the migratory path of the gray whale, both of which have been listed as endangered 
species under section 4 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(l) (Supp 
III 1979). The CCC had determined that the leasing of thirty-one of those tracts would be in-
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In response, California together with a coalition of environmental 
concern groups filed suit in federal district court in Los Angeles 
seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that the Final Notice of Sale for 
Lease Sale No. 53 "directly affected" the California coastal zone and 
that Secretary Watt violated section 307(c)(1) by refusing to conduct 
the leasing in the Santa Maria basin in a manner which was consist-
ent with the California coastal management plan; (2) a writ of man-
damus ordering Secretary Watt to conduct a consistency review and 
submit a consistency determination to the CCC; and (3) a preliminary 
injunction to block the leasing of the thirty-four disputed tracts until 
ninety days after Interior submits a certification of consistency.166 
On May 27, 1981, one day before the scheduled lease sale, Judge 
Mariana R. Pfaelzer issued a preliminary injunction which prevented 
Interior from granting leases for the disputed tracts on the basis that 
California had advanced arguments which indicated a very strong 
possibility of success on the merits of the alleged violation of section 
307(cX1).167 
D. The Legal and Policy Arguments of the Parties in 
Lease Sale No. 48 
1. California's Position168 
California contended that the Final Notice of Sale in Lease Sale 
No. 48 "directly affected" the California coastal zone and, therefore, 
consistent with the California Coastal Zone Management Act. See 12 COASTAL ZONE MANAG-
MENT J. 5 (Jan. 14, 1981). In rejecting all of the recommendations submitted by Governor 
Brown as to the size, timing, and location of the Lease Sale, Secretary Watt stated the en-
vironmental concerns were unwarranted because "offshore oil and gas activities have had an 
excellent environmental record." Boston Globe, Apr. 11, 1981, at 3, col. 5. 
166. California v. Watt, No. 81-20-80 (C.D. Cal., filed Apr. 29, 1981); Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. Watt, No. 81-2081 (C.D. Cal., filed Apr. 29, 1981). The legal and policy 
arguments supporting California's position are substantially the same as those set forth in the 
following section of this article. 
In addition to the alleged violations of section 307(cX1) of the CZMA, the plaintiffs alleged 
that Secretary Watt failed to consider Governor Brown's comments on the terms of Lease No. 
53 in accordance with the standard set forth in section 19 of the OCSLA, see text at notes 
100-03 supra; violated NEPA by preparing an inadequate EIS for the lease sale; and violated 
section 7(aX2) of the Endangered Species Act by failing to obtain adequate biological opinions 
to ensure that the lease sale would not jeopardize the southern sea otter and gray whale 
populations. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2-8, 
California v. Watt, No. 81-2080 (C.D. Cal., filed Apr. 29, 1981). 
167. California v. Watt, No. 81-2080 (C.D. Cal., May 27,1981) (order granting preliminary 
injunction). See New York Times, May 28,1981, at A16, col. 1. With regard to the additional 
claims advanced by California, see note 166 supra, Judge Pfaelzer denied the preliminary in-
junction. The court concluded that the requisite probability of success on the merits had not 
been demonstrated, and that it was not clear that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm 
without the injunction. Transcript of the Proceedings at 102-03, California v. Watt, No. 
81-2080 (C.D. Cal., May 27, 1981). 
168. California's position that a Final Notice of Sale requires a consistency determination 
1980] FEDERAL CONSISTENCY UNDER CZMA 467 
the Department of the Interior was required to submit a consistency 
determination in accordance with section 307(c)(l) of the CZMA.169 
The basis for California's position was that the Final Notice of Sale 
represented the key planning decision for the lease sale because at 
that juncture Interior made its final determinations on both the 
number and location of the tracts to be auctioned, and on the condi-
tions and stipulations to be included in the leases. The Final Notice of 
Sale, California reasoned, therefore established the basic parameters 
regarding where OCS development will be allowed to take place. I7o 
California contended that the Final Notice of Sale set in motion a 
chain of events which ultimately impacted the coastal zone, and that 
section 307(c)(.i) was applicable at the outset of the process. Califor-
nia further argued that Interior's decisions prior to the Final Notice 
of Sale obviously had a "direct effect" on the California coastal zone 
in that decisions to delete tracts resulted in no development on those 
tracts, while decisions to include tracts lead to exploration and often 
to actual development.I'll California analogized Interior's decision to 
lease to a "massive subdivision" of the OCS.I72 
Support for the California position was largely policy oriented. 
California first relied on the policy enunciated in the language of the 
CZMA. The statute's declaration of policy calls for cooperation in 
coordination between federal and state agencies in order to protect 
the resources of the coastal zone. I73 California argued that consisten-
has received the formal support of a number of groups: The National OCS Policy Committee of 
the OCS Advisory Board which advises Interior, The Natural Resources Defense Council, the 
Coastal States Advisory Committee, the Massachusetts Office of Environmental Affairs, and 
the Oregon Department of Land Conservation and Development. California Position Paper, 
supra note 124, at 4; see also 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) (curr. dev.) 1097 (Sept. 7, 1979). In addi-
tion, in a letter to former President Jimmy Carter, Senators Alan Cranston (D-Cal.) and 
Ernest F. Hollings (D-S.C.) urged him to require Interior to determine whether its pre-lease 
sale decisions are consistent with state coastal management programs. 11 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 
(curr. dev.) 235 (June 13, 1980). 
169. California Position Paper, supra note 124, at 3. However, because of the ninety day 
waiting period required by NOAA's regulations, Interior must make its determination of con-
sistency or negative determination at the time it issues the proposed Notice of Sale. See note 
160 supra. 
170. California Position Paper, supra note 124, at 4. California maintains that Interior's 
decision to offer leases to private industry for specific tracts "is the key activity that creates a 
right [in the lessees] to develop those leases." [d. at 3. While a lease sale itself would create the 
right to develop OCS tracts, it is difficult to find validity in California's argument that In-
terior's decision to lease creates any such right. 
171. [d. at 4-5. 
172. [d. at 4. California analogized OCS subdivision to subdivision in land use planning. As 
an example, California noted that when the National Forest Service decides to offer leases for 
timber harvesting in areas in or near the California coastal zone, it submits a consistency 
determination under section 307(c)(I) when it makes the decision. [d. at 3. 
173. 16 U.S.C. § 1452 (1976) (amended 1980); California Position Paper, supra note 124, at 
3. 
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cy review of a proposed lease sale would achieve this goal. California 
also advanced several practical reasons for subjecting the Final 
Notice of Sale to the consistency requirement of section 307(c)(1). 
The most compelling argument is that the Final Notice stage gener-
ally provides the only opportunity under the CZMA to review the 
lease sale as a whole; post-lease sale consistency review under sec-
tion 307(c)(3)(B) must be conducted "piecemeal" on a tract-by-tract 
basisY4 The earlier date is more appropriate, California reasoned, 
because early consistency review would minimize delays and poten-
tial litigation.175 If the terms contained in the Final Notice of Sale 
were consistent with the state's coastal management plan, the con-
sistency issue could not delay the lease sale, because the state could 
not petition for mediation or seek to enjoin the lease sale in court.176 
California further suggested that consistency review prior to the 
Final Notice of Sale would significantly benefit OCS lessees and the 
national interest in OCS development generally. A state's concur-
rence with Interior's consistency determination on the Final Notice 
would assure lessees that the tracts on which they bid would not 
later be found inconsistent with the state's coastal management plan 
and that they are indeed suitable locations for exploration and 
development. Further, lessees would have knowledge of all stipula-
tions and conditions on exploration and development activities which 
the state deems necessary to insure consistency with the state coast-
al programY7 In addition, if the state refused to concur with a con-
sistency determination submitted by Interior and Interior proceeded 
with the lease sale without modification, the lessee would benefit by 
being put on notice of the state's objection, the reasons for the objec-
tion, and the fact that the lessee may encounter later objections 
under section 307(c)(3)(B) consistency reviewYs 
2. The Department of the Interior's Position 
In contrast with that of California, the Department of the In-
terior's legal analysis of the applicability of section 307(c)(1) to its 
pre-lease activities prior to Lease Sale No. 48 was devoid of policy 
174. California Position Paper, supra note 124, at 3. 
175. [d. at 6-7. 
176. [d. at 7. 
177. [d. at 6. 
178. [d. This argument presupposes a legitimate state objection, that there is in fact a 
significant inconsistency in the terms of the lease sale; otherwise the state objection to the sec-
tion 307(c)(3)(B) determination would be subject to override by Commerce. See text at notes 
113-14 supra. 
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considerations. Interior perceived the problem solely as one of statu-
tory construction, the key issue being the legal definition of the term 
"directly affecting."179 Interior asserted that the plain meaning doc-
trine as enunciated by the Supreme Court controlled the interpreta-
tion of the words "directly affecting."18o As a general proposition, 
this rule provides that where the meaning of a statute is plain from 
the language used, a court may not go beyond it to find another 
meaning.181 Instead, the statute should be construed according to 
the intent expressed in the statutory provision itself.182 The purpose 
of this rule is to insure that when a statute is interpreted, the lan-
guage of the provision in question takes precedence over extrinsic 
materials.183 
After determining that no useful legislative, judicial or administra-
tive interpretation of "directly affecting" existed, Interior con-
cluded that it should adopt a "simple and straightforward interpreta-
tion of the term. .'. which reflects the plain meaning of the statutory 
language."184 Interior consulted the dictionary,185 and developed the 
following definitions for use in applying section 307(c)(1): "direct" 
means "without intervening cause," and "effect" means "produce 
an effect or change in."186 Interior therefore concluded that with 
reference to section 307(c)(1), a federal activity "directly affects" 
the coastal zone when the activity produces effects or changes in the 
land or water resources within the coastal zone without any inter-
vening elements.187 Interior noted that it chose the phrase "without 
intervening cause" because it "captured the central meaning of [the] 
relevant dictionary definitions, thus complying with the 'plain mean-
ing rule.' "188 
179. Mediation Conference Report, supra note 152, at 3. 
180. Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 116, at 8. Interior relied on Caminetti v. United States, 
242 U.S. 470 (1917): "It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, 
be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, . . . the sole function 
of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms." Id. at 485. 
181. United States v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929). See 2A C. SANDS, 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.03 (4th ed. 1973). 
182. Id. § 46.01. See Lyman, The Absurdity and Repugnancy of the Plain Meaning Rule of 
Interpretation, 3 MANITOBA L.J. 53 (1969). 
183. 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.03 (4th ed. 1973). 
184. Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 116, at 6. 
185. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1976). 
186. Department of the Interior, Consistency of Pre-Lease Activities: Statement of the 
Department of the Interior for Mediation Regarding OCS Lease Sale No. 48, at 3-5 (presented 
at the Mediation Conference held on October 19, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Interior Position 
Paper]. 
187. Id. at 5. 
188. Id. at 4. 
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Not surprisingly, in applying the above-described interpretation of 
the "directly affecting" threshold test, Interior concluded that none 
of its activities prior to Lease Sale No. 48 had the requisite "direct 
effect."ls9 Interior does not contend that a Final Notice of Sale can 
never "directly affect" the coastal zone. But according to Interior, 
only when a pre-lease decision such as a stipulation contained in the 
Final Notice of Sale would bind a lessee to take or refrain from 
taking immediate action which would have a physical impact on the 
coastal zone, would a. consistency determination be required.190 
Since none of the stipulations contained in the Final Notice of Sale 
for Lease Sale No. 48 required or prohibited any activity which could 
have a physical impact on the California coastal zone, Interior con-
cluded that a consistency determination was not required.191 With 
respect to the final selection of the size and location of the tracts to 
be offered for sale, Interior contended that such decisions could not 
"directly affect" the coastal zone, since no physical impact would oc-
cur without significant subsequent decisions and actions by the OCS 
lessees during the course of exploration and development. 192 The ac-
tions of the OCS lessees would constitute intervening forces which, 
according to Interior's interpretation of the "directly affecting" 
test, precluded a finding of directness. 
189. [d. at 1. 
190. [d. at 6. Since the issuance of the DOJ Opinion, see note 72 supra, Interior has made 
one pre-lease sale consistency determination in accordance with section 307(c)(I). Prior to the 
Final Notice of Sale for Lease Sale No. 49, 44 Fed. Reg. 64,751 (1979), which leased tracts in 
the Beaufort Sea off the northern coast of Alaska in 1979, Interior made a consistency deter-
mination with respect to lease stipulation No.4, but found that no other part of the Final 
Notice directly affected the Alaska coastal zone. 10 COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 1 (Oct. 31, 
1979). Stipulation No.4 prohibited solid waste disposal on artificial islands in marine waters 
within the lease area. Interior concluded that the stipulation could have a direct effect because: 
(1) the requirement imposed a legal restraint on the lessees, i.e. banning the disposal of waste 
"the effects of which could cause physical impacts in the coastal zone which are not 
negligible"; and (2) the requirement was effective immediately "without the necessity of any 
other Federal decision or activity occurring first." Therefore, Interior submitted a determina-
tion letter to Alaska stating that stipulation No.4 was consistent with the Alaska Coastal Zone 
Management Plan. [d. 
191. Interior Position Paper, supra note 186, at 7. In support of its conclusion, Interior set 
forth and analyzed each of the fifteen stipulations in the Final Notice of Sale, and concluded 
that none would cause immediate physical impacts. [d. at 7-11. 
[Ilt should be emphasized that most stipulations and many decisions occurring during 
the pre-leasing process would not directly effect the coastal zone under our analysis 
of the statutory requirement. Further decisions or events must occur first before any 
impact takes place .... The mere possibility of impacts in the coastal zone from ex-
ploration and development activities occurring outside the coastal zone does not lead 
to the conclusion that a direct effect on the coastal zone will result. 
Solicitor's Opinion, supra note 116, at 9-10. 
192. Interior Position Paper, supra note 186, at 11. 
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3. The Petroleum Industry's Position 
During the course of the Lease Sale No. 48 dispute, the American 
Petroleum Institute (API) and the Western Oil and Gas Association 
(WOGA) represented the interests of the petroleum industry, and 
presented its views on the controversy. API is a national trade 
association representing some 350 companies and 7,000 individuals 
engaged in all sectors of the petroleum industry. WOGA is a trade 
association of companies and individuals representing more than 90 
percent of the production, refining, and wholesale marketing of 
petroleum products in six western states, whose members are active-
ly involved in OCS exploration and development off the California 
coast.193 The petroleum industry perceives the federal consistency 
provisions to be threatening to OCS development, and unnecessary 
as well. 194 In recent hearings held in connection with the 1980 re-
authorization of the CZMA, the petroleum industry proposed that 
the consistency provisions be amended to preclude their application 
to OCS activities. 195 The petroleum industry stated its belief that a 
193. Joint Statement on Behalf of the American Petroleum Institute and the Western Oil 
and Gas Association (Oct. 10, 1979) [hereinafter cited as API-WOGA Statement), reprinted 
in 1980 Oversight Hearings, supra note 56, at 276. For purposes of this article, the term 
"petroleum industry" will be used to refer to API and WOGA. 
Although the petroleum industry has expressed support for the overall goals and objectives 
of the CZMA, its attitude has been one of resistance. Thus far the petroleum industry has filed 
suits challenging Commerce's approval of the California, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin 
coastal management programs on the ground that they failed to meet numerous CZMA 
requirements. With respect to the California program, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit recently affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the federal defendants after con-
cluding that NOAA's decision passed muster under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of 
review. American Petroleum Institute v. Knecht, 609 F.2d 1306, 1310 (9th Cir. 1979). The 
challenges to the Massachusetts and Wisconsin plans were dismissed for lack of standing and 
ripeness after the two cases were consolidated for review by Judge Aubrey Robinson. 
American Petroleum Institute v. Knecht, No. 78-623 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 1978); American 
Petroleum Institute v. Knecht, No. 78-684 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 1978); see 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 
(curr. dev.) 1093-94 (Oct. 6, 1978); OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT, REPORT OF THE 
CONGRESS ON COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1978, at 26-30 (1979). 
194. API-WOGA Statement, supra note 193, at 280-83. The CCC responded: 
The concerns raised by the oil industry in opposing CZMA's consistency provisions 
have simply failed to materialize . . . API and WOGA continue to raise the false 
spectre, in spite of the CCC's record in consistency reviews, that section 307 
threatens to stop OCS development altogether .... Although the oil industry has 
continued to "cry wolf" to the courts and Congress, the industry has been unable to 
point to a single instance where consistency has delayed a single project, let alone 
stop the project altogether. 
1980 Oversight Hearings, supra note 56, at 1130 (statement of Michael L. Fischer, Executive 
Director of the California Coastal Commission). 
195. Specifically, the petroleum industry proposed that section 307(c)(3)(A) be amended to 
preclude its applicability to OCS activities, and that section 307(c)(3)(B) be deleted from the 
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jurisdictional conflict exists between the provisions of the CZMA and 
the OCSLA with respect to OCS development. 196 The petroleum in-
dustry believed that the consistency provisions of the CZMA (section 
307(c)(3)(B) in particular) upset the logical balance between the 
federal government, having jurisdiction over the OCS, and the 
states, having jurisdiction of the submerged lands extending sea-
ward to the three mile limit. 197 The petroleum industry reasoned that 
the OCSLA provides more than adequate protection of the environ-
mental interests which the CZMA is intended to protect, specifically 
the coastal areas.198 Therefore, it concluded that the jurisdictional 
"conflict" inherent in the two statutes should be resolved by allow-
ing OCSLA to prevail over the CZMA by eliminating the OCS-
related consistency provisions.199 
As might be expected, the petroleum industry's position as to the 
applicability of section 307(c)(1) to the Final Notice of Sale in Lease 
Sale No. 48 closely paralleled that of the Department of the Interior. 
It maintained that none of Interior's activities prior to Lease Sale 
No. 48 "directly affected" the California coastal zone and, therefore, 
no consistency determination was required. 20o The petroleum indus-
try based its analysis of the applicability of section 307(c)(1) to pre-
lease activities on a literal dictionary-derived interpretation of the 
phrase "directly affecting," similar to that utilized by Interior. The 
CZMA. API-WOGA Statement, supra note 193, at 283. API and WOGA appeared to take for 
granted that section 307(c)(1) is not applicable to OCS pre-lease activities and, therefore, no 
amendment to that section was necessary. 
The petroleum industry has also challenged the federal consistency provisions in court. In 
American Petroleum Institute v. Knecht, 456 F. Supp. 889 (C.D. Cal. 1978), affd, 609 F.2d 
1306 (9th Cir. 1979) the plaintiffs contended that states would abuse the federal consistency 
provisions. The court dismissed the claim for lack of ripeness: "Whether the state [California] 
will utilize its consistency powers improperly to retard or halt energy development are [sic] 
wholly speculative." [d. at 903. 
196. 1980 Oversight Hearings, supra note 56, at 347. 
197. API-WOGA Statement, supra note 193, at 283. 
[d. 
It is logical that the federal agencies responsible for OCS activities retain the final 
authority to issue in a timely manner, the permits or licenses required to help meet 
the national objective of attaining a greater degree of energy self-sufficiency. 
Elimination of federal consistency over OCS activities would accomplish this end. 
198. [d. 
199. [d. 
200. American Petroleum Institute and Western Oil and Gas Association, Statement on 
Behalf of the American Petroleum Institute and the Western Oil and Gas Association at the 
Public Hearing Held in Connection with the Mediation Proceeding on Lease Sale No. 48 (Paper 
presented at the Department of Commerce Mediation Hearing-Sept. 7, 1979), reprinted in 
1980 Oversight Hearings, supra note 56, at 320-21 [hereinafter cited as API-WOGA Position 
Paper]. 
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petroleum industry's position paper also examined judicial interpre-
tation of the words "direct effects" to provide insight into section 
307(c)(1)'s threshold test.201 
In applying its interpretation of "directly affecting" to the Final 
Notice of Sale in Lease Sale No. 48, the petroleum industry con-
cluded that the threshold test was not met because neither the req-
uisite "directness" nor "effect" existed. It reasoned that a Final 
Notice of Sale at most creates a condition of affairs upon which the 
intervening actions of the future lessees must operate before any 
"direct" effect occurs.202 The petroleum industry's interpretation of 
"effect" within the meaning of section 307(c)(1) required that there 
be physical impact;203 the Final Notice had no "effect" on the coastal 
zone, it concluded, because it caused no such impact. 204 
201. [d. at 326-33. The API-WOGA Position Paper cited Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 
F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam). That case involved an action to recover damages for al-
leged breaches of contracts for the sale of crude oil. Plaintiffs based their claims on a provision 
ofthe Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,28 U.S.C. §S 1602-1611 (1976), which allows 
an exception to foreign state immunity from suit in federal courts when an act takes place out-
side of the United States. [d. § 1605(a)(2). The court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction 
after determining that while the cancellation of the contract by the Libyan defendant affected 
the plaintiff, any effect was not direct but indirect. Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d 673, 
676 (2d Cir. 1979). The petroleum industry also relied on Upton v. Empire of Iran, 459 F. 
Supp. 264 (D.D.C. 1978), actions brought for wrongful death and personal injuries under the 
same statute. The court held that the harm suffered by the plaintiffs did not have the requisite 
directness: "[T]he common sense interpretation of a 'direct effect' is one which has no in-
tervening element, but, rather, flows in a straight line without deviation or interruption." The 
court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction since the statute's threshold test was not met. 
[d. at 266. 
The petroleum industry also relied on a series of cases interpreting the word "direct" in a 
negligence context: Key Sales Co. v. South Carolina Electric and Gas Co., 290 F. Supp. 8 
(D.S.C. 1968) (negligence action brought in connection with flooding of plaintiffs 
land-although defendant utility company's conduct brought about the condition of affairs, it 
was not the direct cause of the injury); Anderson v. Steinle, 289 III. App. 167,6 N.E.2d 879 
(1937) (in a negligence action, truck abandoned on the highway was the direct cause of a subse-
quent collision with the truck); Dubuque Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Caylor, 249 F.2d 
162 (10th Cir. 1957) (in an action to recover on an insurance policy, damage was "direct loss" 
from an external cause within the meaning of the policy). 
The petroleum industry proceeded to cite cases even further afield: National Labor Rela-
tions Board v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 106 F.2d 119 (1st Cir. 1939) (regulation of interstate 
commerce-"[dJirect in respect to sequence, either in time or results, means mediate, nothing 
intervening." [d. at 122); General Finance Co. v. Powell, 112 Mt. 535, 118 P.2d 751 (1941) (law 
of attachment). 
202. API-WOGA Position Paper, supra note 193, at 15, reprinted in 1980 Oversight Hear-
ings, supra note 56, at 333. 
203. [d. 
204. [d. 
[T]he Secretary's last pre-leasing activity is simply to issue a piece of paper, known as 
the Final Notice of Sale .... From a common-sense point of view, it is clear that 
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The petroleum industry's interpretation of section 307(c)(1)'s 
"directly affecting" test is even more literal than that of Interior. In 
contrast with Interior's view that certain lease stipulations in a Final 
Notice of Sale could have a "direct effect" on the coastal zone, the 
petroleum industry maintained that section 307(c)(1) can never be 
applied to OCS pre-lease activities; in its view the coastal zone can 
experience a "direct effect" only when exploratory drilling occurs on 
the leased tracts.205 
E. AnA nalysis of the Merits of the 
"Directly Affecting" Dispute 
1. The Department of the Interior and the Petroleum Industry's 
Interpretation of "Directly Affecting" 
A strict and literal interpretation of the "directly affecting" thres-
hold test of section 307(c)(1) would seemingly necessitate the conclu-
sion propounded by the Department of the Interior that the issuance 
of a Final Notice of Sale does not require a consistency determina-
tion. Interior's plain meaning definition of "directly affecting," 
"producing a change or effect in without intervening cause" does in 
fact "capture the central meaning of those terms" as they are de-
fined in the dictionary. Obviously a Final Notice of Sale causes no 
"direct effect" on the coastal zone in the sense of actual physical im-
pact. Nor can the Final Notice be considered the proximate cause in 
a legal sense of any ultimate physical impact. Therefore, under In-
terior's interpretation, pre-lease activities would never have a "di-
rect effect." A series of events and decisions made by the tract 
lessees and the federal and state agencies during the licensing and 
permitting proceedings would constitute intervening elements and 
preclude the earlier pre-lease activities from being "direct." 
Interior's reliance upon the plain meaning rule, however, is mis-
placed. Both the courts and eminent authorities on statutory con-
struction recognize an important caveat to the plain meaning doc-
trine. Assuming the language of the statute is in fact unambig-
UOUS,206 it is nevertheless widely held that a literal interpretation 
should not be utilized if it creates a result which is contrary to the ap-
the foregoing [pre-lease] activities-which consist solely of administrative determina-
tions and coordination of activities geographically far removed from the coastal zone 
-will result in absolutely no physical impact upon that area. 
[d. at 324. 
205. [d. at 333. 
206. The diversity of opinion as to the proper interpretation of "directly affecting," as 
reflected by the California-Interior dispute, leads one to wonder about the "plainness" of the 
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parent intent of the legislature and the words are capable of an in-
terpretation which could effectuate legislative intent.201 "[T]he pur-
pose of the statute should not be sacrificed to a literal interpretation 
of [the statutory provision]."208 Instead, one should consider the 
sense which the words were intended to convey. 209 
The CZMA seeks to encourage states' participation in coastal zone 
management and to foster federal and state cooperation and coordi-
nation in order to protect and preserve coastal areas.210 Congress in-
tended that the federal consistency provisions be the means of ef-
fecting cooperation and coordination between federal and state 
agencies.211 In its interpretation of section 307(c)(1), Interior adopted 
a dictionary definition of "directly affecting" without consideration 
of the purpose of the consistency provision and the purpose of the 
CZMA. Interior's literal interpretation of the threshold test ensures 
that a Final Notice of Sale as a whole will never have the requisite 
"direct effect" for purposes of section 307(c)(1). Cooperation and 
coordination can hardly be furthered where the federal agency 
utilizes a definition which will rarely, if ever, require it to make a con-
sistency determination. Interior's emphasis on literalness thwarts 
the spirit and objectives of the CZMA. In such an instance, reliance 
upon the extreme, dictionary definition version of the plain meaning 
rule is inappropriate. 
statutory provision. See note 56 supra. Where a dispute relates to the interpretation of a 
statute, one can logically argue that there cannot be a plain meaning, since there would then be 
no dispute. Lyman, The Absurdity and Repugnancy of the Plain Meaning Rule of Interpreta· 
tion, 3 MANITOBA L.J. 53 (1969). 
207. See 2A C. SANDs. STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION S 46.07 (4th ed. 1973); In-
ternational Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 
243 (1952) ("[L]iteralness is no sure touchstone of legislative purpose."); Lawson v. Suwannee 
Fruit and Steamship Company, 336 U.S. 198 (1949); Harrison v. Northern Trust Company, 
317 U.S. 476 (1943); Giuseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608,624 (2d Cir. 1944)("There is no surer 
way to misread any document than to read it literally."). 
208. Pierce v. Van Dusen, 78 F. 693, 696 (6th Cir. 1897). See 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION S 46.07 (4th ed. 1973 & Supp. 1980); Murphy, Old Statutes Never 
Die: The "Plain Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal 
Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1299 (1975); Merz, The Meaninglessness of the Plain Meaning Rule, 
4 DAYTON L. REV. 31 (1979). 
209. J. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND ApPLICATION OF STATUTES 230 (1975). Dicker-
son notes that the most extreme application of the plain meaning doctrine is the rule of 
literalness: "Statutory words must be given effect according to their relevant dictionary 
senses. So stated the rule is simple nonsense; to exclude consideration of context would be to 
ignore one of the basic principles of communication." Id. (quoting Willis, Statutory Interpreta-
tion in a Nutshell, 16 CANADA B. REv. i, 10 (1938». 
210. 16 U.S.C. SS 1451(h), 1452 (1976) (amended 1980). 
211. See, e.g., 118 CONGo REC. 26,479 (1972), reprinted in CZMA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 1, at 370. 
212. See note 201 supra. 
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The petroleum industry's analysis of section 307(c)(1) and OCS 
pre-lease activities similarly disregards the purpose of consistency 
review. Its position paper on Lease Sale No. 48 examines judicial in-
terpretation of the term "direct effects" in a wide variety of con-
texts.212 However, all of the cases cited deal with issues far removed 
from coastal zone management and environmental law: Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act; regulation of interstate travel; wrongful 
death actions, and the like. It is well established that a troublesome 
statutory provision may be interpreted by analogy to the language of 
other statutes not specifically related but which apply to similar per-
sons, things, or relationships.213 Even so, the probative value of 
analogy to similar but unrelated statutes is generally considered 
limited. 214 Not only are the statutes and case law relied on by the 
petroleum industry totally unrelated to the CZMA, they do not even 
remotely relate to similar things or relationships. As such, the 
analogies drawn do not have the requisite connection with the 
CZMA, and therefore should have little bearing on the interpretation 
of section 307(cX1). 
2. California's Interpretation of "Directly Affecting" 
In its request for a consistency determination prior to the Final 
Notice of Sale, the CCC seeks to participate at the decision-making 
stage of the leasing process, rather than being limited to determin-
ing the consistency of OCS-related activities after the lease sale has 
occurred. One of the many difficulties with the language of section 
307(c)(1) of the CZMA is that it does not address the timing aspect of 
the determination of consistency. The only possible clue lies in the 
word "direct." The major problem with California's request for a 
consistency determination prior to the Final Notice of Sale is that a 
decision by its very nature cannot have a "direct" effect, if the literal 
"without intervening cause" interpretation is utilized. However, as 
discussed in the preceding section, there are persuasive arguments 
against the use of strict statutory interpretation in this instance. 
While Interior's analysis focuses on the literal "direct effects" of 
the Final Notice of Sale, California examines the cumulative effect 
of the OCS leasing process on the coastal zone. It is a matter of 
common knowledge that the consequences of an OCS lease sale have 
213. 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION S 53.03 (4th !;!d. 1973); see, e.g., 
Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125 (1943) (different statutory provisions using the 
phrase "engaged in commerce"); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 132 (1943); 
Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207 (1955). 
214. 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 53.05 (4th ed. 1973) (and 
cases cited therein). 
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a profound and long-lasting effect on a state's coastal zone. Exam-
ples of coastal zone impacts include large-scale onshore development 
such as: pipeline landfalls, harbor supply bases, refineries, and deep-
water ports;215 increases in coastal area population due to labor and 
staffing requirements of the energy-related facilities; hazards to ma-
rine and coastal resources posed by OCS exploration and drilling; 
and the dangers inherent in the transportation of recovered crude 
oil, notably the ever present threat of oil spills.216 California justi-
fiably contends that a consistency determination should be made 
prior to the final decision which sets in motion the chain of events 
which ultimately cause the effect. A Final Notice of Sale, which 
conclusively determines the number and location of tracts to be 
leased as well as lease stipulations and conditions, does constitute 
the key decision in the OCS leasing process. 
The application of section 307(c)(1) at the decision-making stage of 
a proposed federal activity, rather than at the point at which a literal 
effect results, best serves the stated policies and goals of the CZMA. 
The consistency provision is the vehicle which effects a planning 
relationship between the federal and state agencies. If the Depart-
ment of the Interior were to conclude that its pre-lease activities 
"directly affected" the coastal zone, it would submit a consistency 
determination after reviewing its proposed activity in light of the 
state's coastal management program. The state would review the 
consistency determination, and inform Interior of its agreement 
or disagreement with the determination. Such a procedure would 
achieve the coordination and cooperation which the CZMA contem-
plates. However, logic dictates that this procedure is meaningful 
only if it takes place at the planning stages of a proposed activity. It 
is hard to believe that Congress intended this planning relationship 
to arise only at the time when the activity literally affected the coast-
al zone. 
California's request for a consistency determination prior to a 
Final Notice of Sale necessitates a liberal interpretation of the term 
"directly affecting"; NOAA's current regulations specifically call for 
such an interpretation of section 307(c)(1)'s threshold test. Although 
the regulations do not define "directly affecting," the pertinent sec-
tions and comments provide guidance as to the proper operation of 
section 307(c)(1). First, with respect to the applicability of section 
215. See note 12 supra. 
216. See OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON COASTAL 
ZONE MANAGEMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1978, 42 (1979); s. REP. No. 277, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 
17 (1975), reprinted in CZMA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note I, at 743. 
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307(c)(1), NOAA has stated that the threshold test should be "con-
strued liberally" in order to ,"favor inclusion of federal activities sub-
ject to consistency·review."217 Second, NOAA addresses the timing 
aspect of consistency review. Once a federal agency concludes that 
the activity in. question will have a "direct effect" on' the coastal 
zone, it should provide the consistency determination at the "earliest 
practicable time in the planning or reassessment of the activity," 
since the purpose of consistency review is to provide the state with 
an "opportunity to review and comment upon the proposed activi-
ty."218 
In analyzing the merits of the contentions raised in the "directly 
affecting" dispute, it is important to consider the fact that if Califor-
nia litigates the issue of pre-lease consistency, NOAA's regulations 
will carry considerable weight. Because of its expertise within the 
sphere of coastal zone management, a court will examine the regula-
tions promulgated by NOAA under the "arbitrary and capricious" 
standard of review;219 NOAA's construction of section 307(c)(1) will 
not be overruled unless clearly erroneous.220 The language of the 
regulations provides strong support for consistency review at the 
decision-making stage of a federal activity which will have a "direct 
effect" on the coastal zone. In contrast, the regulations contain no 
mention of the literal "intervening cause" interpretation of "directly 
affecting" propounded by Interior. In fact, Interior's rationale for 
the negative determinations on Lease Sale No. 48 and Lease Sale 
No. 53 seems to be the antithesis of the liberal application of the 
"directly affecting" test which the regulations call for. 
The 1980 reauthorization and amendments to the CZMA221 did not 
alter any of the section 307 consistency provisions; both the House 
and Senate reports acknowledged the dispute between California 
and the Department of the Interior, but concluded that an amend-
. ment to section 307(c)(1) would be premature.222 However, both con-
gressional reports provide considerable insight into Congress' cur-
217. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,146-47 (1979) (comment to 15 C.F.R. S 930.33 (1979». 
218. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,146-47 (1979) (comment to 15 C.F.R. SS 930.34(b), 930.33(c) (1979» . 
. 219. 5 U.S.C. S 706(2)(A) (1976); American Petroleum Institute v. Knecht, 456 F. Supp. 889, 
903-08 (C.D. Cal. 1978), aff'd, 609 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1979). "A somewhat special situation is 
presented where an agency charged with implementing a new statute construes it. Courts 
tend to be more deferential to practical administrative interpretations of disputed provisions 
of the governing statute in such a case." [d. at 907. 
220. [d. at 906. 
221. Coastal Zone Management Improvement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96·464,. 94 Stat. 
2060 (1980). 
222. H.R. REp. No, 1012, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1980); S. REp. No. 783, 96th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 10-11 (1980). 
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rent thought on the interpretation ofthe term "directly affecting" in 
section 307(c)(I). Obviously, subsequent legislative history does not 
provide a basis for inferring legislative intent as of the enactment of 
the provision. 223 Yet since there is no helpful interpretation of the 
threshold test in the original legislative history,224 it seems ap-
propriate that NOAA give consideration to this factor. The 1980 
legislative history provides strong support for the application of sec-
tion 307(c)(I) at the decision-making stage of federal activities that 
will ultimately have a "direct effect" on the coastal zone. 
The 1980 congressional reports suggest three interpretations for 
section 307(c)(I)'s threshold test, each of which is considerably 
broader than that urged by the Department of the Interior. First, the 
House report confirms a previous congressional statement that sec-
tion 307(c)(l) applies "whenever a federal activity had afunctional 
interrelationship from an economic, geographic or social standpoint 
with a state coastal program's land or water use policies."225 The 
House report suggests a second threshold interpretation stating that 
the consistency requirement should apply "when a Federal agency 
initiates a series of events of coastal zone consequence . . . . "226 It 
further provides that "an expansive interpretation of the threshold 
test is compatible with the amendment to section 303 calling for Fed-
eral agencies and others to participate and cooperate in carrying out 
the purposes of the act."227 A third interpretation of the threshold 
test is provided in the Senate report which perceives consistency 
review to be "an opportunity [for states] to plan for and respond to 
the effects of Federal activities which carry a direct link to impacts 
in the coastal zone."228 In addition, the Senate report specifically 
discusses the relationship between section 307(cXl) and OCS pre-
lease activities: 
The Department of the Interior's activities which preceded lease 
sales were to remain subject to the requirements of section 
307(c)(1). As a result, intergovernmental coordination for pur-
poses of OCS development commences at the earliest practic-
able time in the opinion of the Committee, as the Department of 
the Interior sets in motion a series of events which have conse-
quences in the coastal zone.229 
223. J. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND ApPLICATION OF STATUTES 179 (1975). 
224. See text at notes 51-53 supra. 
225. H.R. REp. No. 1012, ~6th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1980) (emphasis added). 
226. Id. (emphasis added). 
227. Id. at 35. 
228. S. REP. No. 783, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1980) (emphasis added). 
229. Id. at 11. ' 
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Congress' use of the words "interrelationship," "consequence," 
and "link" to describe section 307(cX1)'s threshold test suggest a 
much less rigorous standard than that urged by the Department of 
the Interior. A Final Notice of Sale would easily satisfy each of these 
interpretations of section 307(cX1). Moreover, the Final Notice 
represents the "earliest practicable time" to make the consistency 
determination. The Final Notice of Sale establishes the framework 
for the lease sale, and thereby initiates a series of events of "conse-
quence" to the coastal zone. It is important to note that, as with 
NOAA's regulations, nothing in the 1980 congressional reports sup-
ports Interior's interpretation of "directly affecting." Instead the 
reports reiterate NOAA's directives that the threshold requirement 
should be construed liberally and that consistency review should take 
place early, in the planning stages of a proposed federal activity. 
If Interior submits a consistency determination under section 
307(c)(l) prior to a Final Notice of Sale, it affords the state a route 
for review of the terms of the lease sale in addition to that available 
under the OCSLA. It has been argued that as a practical matter no 
additional benefit is provided by the consistency review route 
because the OCSLA affords more than adequate environmental safe-
guards and, therefore, the application of section 307(c)(l) to pre-
lease activities is duplicative and unnecessary.230 For example, had 
Interior made a consistency determination under section 307(c)(l) 
prior to Lease Sale No. 48, that action would have had little or no ef-
fect on the substantive terms of the lease sale. Since Interior reacted 
very positively to the environmental assessment studies of the pro-
posed lease sale and the governor's recommendations and comments 
under OCSLA section 19, California agreed that the terms of the 
lease sale were, with minor exceptions, consistent with the Qalifor-
230. API-WOGA Position Paper, supra note 193, at 17-18, 23, reprinted in 1980 Oversight 
Hearings, supra note 56, at 335-36, 341. See text at notes 194-99 supra. 
The corollary to this argument is that section 307(c)(3)(B) obviates the need for pre-lease 
consistency determinations. Interior's negative determination on Lease Sale No. 53 stated: 
Through [its) authority under this section [307(cX3XB»), the California Coastal Com-
mission (Ccq can, barring the exceptional case of an override by the Secretary of 
Commerce . . . , prevent or require modification of any of the federally permitted 
OCS operational activities, and their associated facilities, which affect any land use or 
water use in the coastal zone and are found to be inconsistent with the CCMP. 
Letter from Larry E. Meierotto, Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Interior, to 
Michael L. Fischer, Executive Director of the California Coastal Commission (October 22, 
1980). This second rationale appears to be extremely tenuous, in that it is a modified version of 
Interior's argument that section 307(c)(3)(B) supersedes section 307(c)(1) with respect to OCS 
activities. The Department of Justice expressly rejected that argument. See text at notes 
131-34 supra. 
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nia coastal management program. In fact, the circumstances sur-
rounding that lease sale appear to lend credence to the contentions 
raised by the petroleum industry that pre-lease consistency review is 
duplicative of the OCSLA state review procedures. 
There are, however, several practical benefits afforded by requir-
ing that a Final Notice of Sale be subject to section 307(c)(1). Under 
the OCSLA the state governor rather than the state agency charged 
with the administration of the coastal management program submits 
comments and recommendations on the terms of a proposed lease 
sale. Although the governor would presumably seek the expert ad-
vice of the state coastal management agency prior to submitting 
comments to Interior under section 19, the OCSLA imposes no such 
requirement. It is possible that the governor's views could differ 
significantly from those of the coastal management agency. In addi-
tion, the governor is not required by the OCSLA to review the lease 
sale terms; comments "may" be submitted. Moreover, the OCSLA 
provides no objective criteria upon which a governor should base any 
recommendations. In contrast, under the CZMA the state agency 
which administers the coastal management program reviews a con-
sistency determination. The state agency reviews the terms of a pro-
posed lease sale for conformity with its approved coastal manage-
ment program, which embodies the CZMA's comprehensive goals 
and policies,231 and thereby provides the objective criteria which 
review under the OCSLA lacks.232 
Both the CZMA and the OCSLA require Interior to consider the 
impact of OCS development on the resources of the coastal zone. 
However, the standard for assessment of environmental risks as set 
forth in the OCSLA appears to be significantly less stringent than 
that in section 307(c)(1) of the CZMA. Under the OCSLA, the 
Secretary of the Interior must accept a state recommendation only if 
he or she determines that the recommendation provides for a reason-
able balance between the national interest and the well-being of the 
citizens of the affected states.233 Moreover, a court will review a 
decision made by the Secretary with regard to a state recommend-
ation under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard.234 In contrast, 
section 307(c)(1) of the CZMA provides that the federal activity must 
be consistent with the state coastal management program to the 
231. 16 U.S.C. § 1452 (1976) (amended 1980). See note 34 supra. 
232. See Sloan, Application of the Federal Consistency Provisions to Outer Continental 
Shelf Leasing, 2 STAN. ENVT'L L. ANN. 144, 165-66 (1979). 
233. 43 U.S.C. § 1345(c) (Supp. III 1979). 
234. [d. § 1345(d). 
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maximum extent practicable, which has been interpreted by NOAA 
to mean that the activity must be consistent unless prohibited by 
law.286 Although section 307(c)(1) cannot be used to prevent Interior 
from proceeding with a lease sale the terms of which a state believes 
are inconsistent with its coastal management plan, the state could 
presumably enjoin the lease sale pending adjudication of the issue of 
consistency, assuming, of course, that the controversy meets the 
equitable requirements for the issuance of an injunction. 286 
235. See text at note 41 supra. 
236. When considering requests for preliminary injunctions, courts have traditionally 
balanced four factors: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will ultimately prevail on the merits of 
the claim; (2) the extent to which the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if relief is not 
granted; (3) the extent to which the opposing party will be harmed if relief is granted; and (4) 
the public interest in granting the injunction. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. 
Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584, 625 (D. Minn. 1973), affd 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974). See generaUy 
7 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE' 65.18[31 (2d ed. 1979). The action brought to enjoin Lease 
Sale No. 53, see text at.notes 164-67 supra, represents the first time a state has attempted to 
enjoin a lease sale on the basis at an alleged violation of section 307(c)(1). Two recent decisions, 
however, indicate an unwillingness on the part of the courts to grant a preliminary injunction 
prior to a lease sale, on the basis that an environmental statute has been violated. 
In North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 326 (D.D.C. 1979) the plaintiffs sought to 
enjoin Lease Sale No. 49 which was scheduled to lease tracts in the Beaufort Sea off the north-
ern coast of Alaska. The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs had made a substantial show-
ing that Interior had failed to comply with certain provisions of the Endangered Species Act, 
16 U.S.C. SS 1531-1543 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), and NEPA. Nevertheless, the court denied 
the motion for preliminary injunction after concluding that the pliUntiffs would not be ir-
reparably harmed by the lease sale. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 326, 331 
(D.D.C. 1979). A permanent injunction was subsequently issued on narrower grounds than 
those urged by the plaintiffs. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 326, 332 (D.D.C. 
1980). However, the permanent injunction was vacated by the Court of Appeals. 14 ENVIR. 
REP. (BNA) (Envir. Rep. Cas.) 1001 (D.D.C. Feb. 1, 1980). 
In Conservation Law Foundation v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712 (1st Cir. 1979) the Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction prior 
to Lease Sale No. 42, which ultimately leased tracts on George's Bank. The court relied in part 
on North Slope Borough and held that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the alleged 
violations of the Endangered Species Act would prevail on the merits. Moreover, the court 
concluded that the plaintiffs would not suffer irreparable harm as a result of the lease sale. fd. 
at 720. 
In each case the court relied on the lis pendens doctrine in reaching the conclusion that the 
plaintiffs would not suffer irreparable harm as a result of the lease sale. Stated broadly, this 
rule provides that a person who purchases property which is the subject of pending litigation 
takes the property charged with knowledge of the litigation and subject to any judgment 
subsequently rendered. See, e.g., County of Presidio v. Noel-Young Bond & Stock Co., 212 
U.S. 58, 76 (1909). With respect to the two lease sales, the courts in North Slope Borough and 
eLF v. Andrus concluded that while a lease sale does vest property rights in the lessees, the 
plaintiffs' filing of suit act$d aBalispendens on the lease sale. The leases would be issued sub-
ject to the courts' later decision On the riierits of the pending lawsuit. AccOrdingly, the courts 
concluded, the lease sale would not cause the plaintiffs irreparable harm and the denial of in-
junctive relief was appropriate. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 326, 331 
(D.D.C. 1979); Conservation Law Foundation v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712,720 (1st Cir. 1979). For 
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While pre-lease consistency review would involve an additional 
procedural requirement for Interior, the burden would not be 
great237 and the application of section 307(c)(1) to OCS pre-lease ac-
tivities would likely increase efficiency in the overall OCS develop-
ment process. Section 307(c)(3)(B) insures that OCS operations can-
not be conducted in a location or manner which the state coastal 
management agency deems inconsistent with its coastal program. If 
Interior submits a consistency determination and the state concurs, 
it is likely that later consistency review under section 307(c)(3)(B) 
would be ~onsiderably expedited. Since the post-lease sale OCS ac-
tivities must be consistent under section 307(c)(3)(B), it seems prac-
tical that Interior cooperate early with the state, prior to the lease 
sale, in an attempt to develop consistent terms.238 If, however, In-
terior does not modify the lease sale terms in response to a state ob-
jection, at least lessees are made aware of potential consistency 
problems which may be encountered during review under section 
307(c)(3)(B). 
The inevitable acceleration of OCS development which will take 
place under the Reagan administration provides the most persuasive 
argument in favor of pre-lease consistency review. President 
Reagan's policy on OCS development has been summed up as fol-
lows: "production, production, production!"239 The Reagan Energy 
Task Force in an as yet unpublished report has called for OCS oil and 
gas leases for the petroleum industry "on demand," as part of a new 
national effort to accelerate energy development.24o Although 
former Secretary Andrus responded favorably to state recom-
a detailed discussion of this novel application of lis pendens, see Fryer, CLF v. A ndrus and Oil 
Drilling on George's Bank: The First Circuit A ttempts to Balance Conflicting Interests, 8 B.C. 
ENV. AFF. L. REV. 201, 280-88 (1979). 
The willingness of the courts in North Slope BorfYUgh and CLF v. Andrus to utilize the lis 
pendens doctrine and avoid enjoining the lease sales does, therefore, cast doubt on the 
likelihood that a preliminary injunction could be obtained on the basis of a section 307(c)(1) 
violation, even if a court were to make an initial finding that the terms of the lease sale were 
inconsistent with a state's coastal management program. 
237. See text at notes 154-55 supra. 
238. The Department of the Interior's failure to review a Final Notice of Sale for consisten-
cy could result in the needless expenditure of federal funds. If a state were to conclude pur-
suant to section 307(c)(3)(B) that the development of a leased tract would be inconsistent with 
its coasta.! management program, Interior might be forced to cancel the lease and pay a con-
siderable sum in damages to the lessee. This problem would be avoided if consistency were 
achieved before the lessee's development rights vest. See Deller, Federalism and Offshore Oil 
and Gas Leasing: Must Federal Tract Selections and Lease Stipulations Be Consistent with 
Coastal Zone Management Programs? 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 105, 122 (1980). 
239. Reagan's New Directions, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 1, 1980, at 32. 
240. Boston Globe, Dec. 13, 1980, at 1, col. 1. 
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mendations and comments on Lease Sale No. 48 and Lease Sale No. 
53, there is every indication that Secretary Watt will not be as recep-
tive. In fact, one would be unrealistic not to expect the opposite, in 
view of his decision to reconsider for leasing the four northern 
California basin areas previously protected by Secretary Andrus.241 
The consistency requirement of section 307(c)(1) can provide an 
additional process for state review of OCS pre-lease activities, in the 
event that the Department of the Interior, under the leadership of 
new Secretary Watt 242 does not properly address environmental 
concerns in accordance with the requirements of the OCSLA. Thus 
far, California has argued for pre-lease consistency review to set a 
precedent for future lease sales which might be inconsistent with its 
coastal management program. Under the Reagan administration, 
the need for pre-lease consistency as exemplified by Lease Sale No. 
53 has become a reality. 
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE "DIRECTLY AFFECTING" PROBLEM 
The basic problem with the threshold test of section 307(c)(1) is the 
statutory requirement that an effect be "direct." A literal interpre-
tation of the word "direct" in and of itself precludes the liberal ap-
plication of the threshold test called for by NOAA's regulations and 
the 1980 CZMA congressional reports. The interpretation problem 
would best be solved by amendment. Section 307(c)(1) should be 
amended to eliminate the word "directly" and substitute the word 
"significantly," thus adopting a threshold test to measure the effects 
of federal activities under the CZMA which is identical to that pres-
ently utilized under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEP A) 
for an environmental impact statement (EIS).243 As the dispute be-
tween California and the Department of the Interior indicates, a 
primary problem with the application of section 307(c)(1) is the 
241. See text at notes 164-67 supra. 
242. Former Secretary of the Interior, Cecil D. Andrus, was noted for his attention to en-
vironmental concerns. See Boston Globe, Feb. 12, 1981, at 21, col. 1. However, new Secretary 
Watt has been sharply criticized for his lack of familiarity and sympathy with environmental 
law and for his antagonistic attitude toward environmental concern groups. See Sagebrush 
Rebel at Interior, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 5, 1981, at 17. 
243. 43 U.S.C. S 4332(2)(C) (1976). NOAA's adoption of the "significantly affecting" 
threshold test for the federal consistency provisions was retracted after the Department of 
Justice Opinion made clear that it represented an unauthorized deviation from the language of 
the statute. See text at notes 70-76 supra. For this reason the "significance" standard should 
be adopted by legislative amendment. 
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dearth of useful guidance in the form of administrative or judicial in-
terpretation of the present threshold test. In the absence of 
legislative history which indicates a purpose or benefit to be derived 
from the use of the word "directly," the adoption of a threshold test 
used in an environmental statute with a provision similar to that of 
section 307(c)(1) seems particularly appropriate. 
Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA requires that an EIS be prepared for 
proposed "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality 
of the human environment . . . . "244 The purpose of EIS prepara-
tion is to identify environmental issues and to compel federal agen-
cies to consider all environmental consequences of a proposed fed-
eral action prior to final approval. 245 NEP A's guidelines require that 
an EIS be prepared "early enough so that it can serve practically as 
an important contribution to the decision-making process," and not 
be used to rationalize or justify decisions already made .... "246 
The Supreme Court has held that the proper time for the preparation 
of an EIS is when the project reaches the status of a proposal.247 
With respect to the application of NEPA's threshold test, the 
guidelines set out a series of factors to consider in determining the 
"significance" of a proposed federal action.248 Most relevant to the 
OCS lease sale process are: (1) the degree to which the effects on the 
environment are likely to be controversial; (2) the degree to which 
244. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976). 
245. See, e.g., Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 849, 851 
(8th Cir. 1973); Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269, 274-75 (W.D. Wash. 1972), aff'd per 
curiam, 487 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 
806, 810 (E.D. Tenn. 1972). For comprehensive discussions of the application of NEPA's 
threshold test, see Shea, The Judicial Standard for Review of Environmental Impact State-
ment Threshold Decisions, 9 B.C. ENV. AFF. L. REV. 63 (1981); McGarity, The Courts, the 
Agencies, and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 TEX. L. REV. 801 (1977). 
246. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.5 (1978). 
247. Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures 
(SCRAP), 422 U.S. 289, 320 (1975); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 (1976). 
248. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (1978). The guidelines set forth these factors as follows: 
"Significantly" as used in NEPA requires considerations of both context and intensi-
ty: 
(a) Context. This means that the significance of an action must be analyzed in 
several contexts such as society as a whole (human, national), the affected region, the 
affected interests, and the locality. Significance varies with the setting of the pro-
posed action. For instance, in the case of a site-specific action, significance would 
usually depend upon the effects in the locale rather than in the world as a whole. Both 
short- and long-term effects are relevant. 
(b) Intensity. This refers to the severity of impact. Responsible officials must bear 
in mind that more than one agency may make decisions about partial aspects of a ma-
jor action. The following should be considered in evaluating intepsity: 
486 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 9:431 
the action may establish a precedent for future actions with signifi-
cant effects; and (3) whether the action is related to other actions 
with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant im-
pacts.249 
The policies and purposes of NEP A and the CZMA are very 
similar; NEP A is designed to protect and preserve the quality of the 
environment, while the CZMA embodies the same goals with regard 
to the coastal zone. Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA and section 307(c)(1) 
of the CZMA are the vehicles for implementing those goals. EIS 
preparation forces federal agencies to consider the environmental 
consequences of proposed actions, while consistency review can in-
sure that federal agencies take cognizance of the coastal protective 
requirements of state management programs in the planning stages 
of their activities. 
[d. 
(1) Impacts that may be both beneficial and adverse. A significant effect may 
exist even if the Federal agency believes that on balance the effect will be 
beneficial. 
(2) The degree to which the proposed action affects public health or safety. 
(3) Unique characteristics of the geographic area such as proximity to historic 
or cultural resources, park lands, prime farmlands, wetlands, wild and scenic 
rivers, or ecologically critical areas. 
(4) The degree to which the effects on the quality of the human environment 
are likely to be highly controversial. 
(5) The degree to which the possible effects of the human environment are 
highly uncertain or involve unique or unknown risks. 
(6) The degree to which the action may establish a precedent for future actions 
with significant effects or represents a decision in principle about a future con-
sideration. 
(7) Whether the action is related to other actions with individually insignificant 
but cumulatively significant impacts. Significance exists if it is reasonable to an-
ticipate a cumulatively significant impact on the environment. Significance can-
not be avoided by terming an action temporary or by breaking it down into small 
component parts. 
(8) The degree to which the action may adversely affect districts, sites, 
highways, structures, or objects listed in or eligible for listing in the National 
Register of Historic Places or may cause loss or destruction of significant scien-
tific, cultural, or historical resources. 
(9) The degree to which the action may adversely affect an endangered or 
threatened species or its habitat that has been determined to be critical under the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973. 
(10) Whether the action threatens a violation of Federal, State, or local law re-
quirements imposed for the protection of the environment. 
249. [d. § 1508.27(b)(4), (6}-(7). NEPA requires the cumulation of impacts for purposes of 
determining whether a federal activity has a significant effect under section 102(2)(C). Where 
a federal action, such as the issuance of the proposed Notice of Sale in an OCS lease sale, sets 
in motion a series of events which ultimately have a significant effect on the environment, EIS 
preparation is required at the outset, even though the initial action is remote with respect to 
the ultimate impact. [d. § 1508.27(b)(7). 
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With respect to the OCS leasing process, Interior prepares an EIS 
after tentative tract selection and prior to the proposed Notice of 
Sale.250 Thus, NEPA compliance is incorporated into the OCSLA re-
quirements. Since the Department of the Interior must conduct a 
comprehensive analysis of the potential impacts of the proposed 
lease sale on the quality of the environment for EIS purposes, to con-
duct a review of the consistency of the terms of the lease sale at the 
same time would impose only a slight additional burden. 
In the implementation of NEP A it has been well recognized that it 
is critical to undertake environmental review at the outset of a 
federal project. 251 The adoption of the "significantly affecting" test 
for section 307(c)(1) would codify the requirement of federal con-
sistency review at the decision-making stage of a proposed activity 
as presently contemplated by NOAA and the 1980 Congress. Con-
siderable practical benefit could be derived from the amendment. 
NOAA could abandon the arduous and thus far unsuccessful attempt 
to define "directly affecting." NOAA could pattern regulations for 
section 307(c)(1) of the CZMA on the guidelines currently pro-
mulgated for section 102(2)(C) of NEPA by the Council on En-
vironmental Quality and thereby incorporate the requirement of a 
liberal application of the "significantly affecting" standard. Of par-
ticular benefit would be the large body of NEP A case law inter-
preting the "significantly affecting" test. 
Consistency review under section 307(c)(1), like NEPA's EIS re-
quirement, can provide information of critical importance in achiev-
ing our national goal of swift and environmentally sensible OCS 
development. Like environmental information derived from EIS 
preparation, state input through use of the consistency provision will 
best serve that goal if received at the decision-making stage of a pro-
posed lease sale. The adoption of the "significantly affecting" stand-
ard for section 307(c)(1) by legislative amendment would assure 
early consideration of the policies and objectives of the CZMA. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The development of the OCS is an essential element in this nation's 
effort to increase energy self-sufficiency and to reduce dependence 
on foreign petroleum imports. It is equally essential that affected 
250. 43 U.S.C. § 1346 (Supp. III 1979). See Fryer, CLF v. Andrus, and Oil Drilling on 
George's Bank: The First Circuit Attempts to Balance Conflicting Interests, 8 B.C. ENV. AFF. 
L. REV. 201 (1979). 
251. See text at notes 244-48 supra. 
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states be afforded ample opportunity to assess and plan for the com-
plex and potentially hazardous impacts to which their coastal areas 
are subjected as a result of OCS development. The CZMA and the 
OCSLA each address and attempt to accommodate these competing 
concerns, but the overall objectives of the two statutes are at odds; 
the OCSLA seeks to promote rapid and orderly development of the 
OCS, while the primary goal of the CZMA is to protect and preserve 
coastal areas. 
The OCSLA and the CZMA each provide procedures for state 
review of OCS lease sales. But although section 307(c)(1) of the 
CZMA has explicitly been found applicable to the pre-lease activities 
of the Department of the Interior which have a "direct effect" on the 
coastal zone, Interior has declined to make use of this federal-state 
planning device. Thus, state review of proposed lease sales has been 
limited to the procedures available under the OCSLA. 
Congress intended that the federal consistency provisions of the 
CZMA give states leverage over federal activities affecting the 
coastal zone as an incentive to implement coastal management pro-
grams. However, any leverage gained as a result of section 307(c)(1) 
has been minimal. NOAA's current regulations call for early con-
sistency review and a liberal application of section307(c)(1),s thresh-
old test. Yet the determination of whether an activity "directly af-
fects" the coastal zone rests with the federal agency. The Depart-
ment of the Interior's position that OCS pre-lease activities will only 
rarely have a "direct effect" on the coastal zone illustrates the ability 
of a federal agency to interpret and apply section 307(c)(1) in a man-
ner which effectively precludes the applicability of the provision to 
its activity. This result thwarts the purpose of the CZMA. 
In essence, the problem with section 307(c)(1) is that early con-
sistency review and a liberal application of the threshold test cannot 
be easily reconciled with the language of the provision. While the 
regulations and present congressional thought indicate that con-
sistency determinations should be made at the decision-making stage 
of a proposed federal activity, a literal interpretation of the words 
"directly affecting" precludes consistency review at this stage since 
a decision by its very nature will not literally affect the coastal zone. 
The dispute between California and the Department of the Interior 
as to the proper application of the "directly affecting" test exempli-
fies this dichotomy. 
The adoption of NEPA's "significantly affecting" threshold test 
would insure early consistency review and best achieve coordination 
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and cooperation between federal and state agencies in protecting 
and preserving coastal areas. Since the Department of Justice has in-
dicated that NOAA's definition of section 307(c)(1)'s threshold test 
cannot deviate from the language of the statute, the implementation 
of the "significantly affecting" standard would best be affected by 
legislative amendment. 
